Givens v. State, 188 A.3d 903

Background

Albert Givens was convicted of first-degree murder (sentenced to life without parole) after multiple trials; the conviction at issue followed extensive pretrial and post-conviction litigation.
Victim Marlene Kilpatrick was found brutally assaulted in January 1992; a partially full Coca‑Cola bottle with saliva (later matched to Givens) and a 15‑inch Craftsman crescent wrench (recovered from Givens’s toolbox months later) were among items investigated.
Early testing (1992) of a swab and a scraping from the wrench produced no usable DNA profile despite several PCR amplification attempts; serology showed only a weak presumptive blood reaction on the scraping.
Givens sought post‑conviction STR DNA testing of the wrench scraping under Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 8‑201, arguing modern STR methods could produce exculpatory evidence (i.e., show the wrench was not the murder weapon).
The circuit court found STR testing is a generally accepted method but denied the petition, concluding there was no reasonable probability testing would produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether CP § 8‑201(d) requires ordering STR testing of the wrench scraping	Givens: modern STR testing might recover DNA and, if not the victim’s, would tend to exculpate or impeach State experts	State: prior PCR attempts consumed/failed to yield DNA; even if STR worked, results would likely be inculpatory, confirm Givens, be inconclusive, or reflect third‑party DNA that does not exculpate	Affirmed denial: testing method acceptable but no reasonable probability results would produce exculpatory/mitigating evidence
Whether the scraping qualifies as “scientific identification evidence” under § 8‑201(a)(5)	Givens: scraping is related evidence in State possession that may produce DNA	State: prior testing likely consumed any biological material so scraping may no longer contain recoverable DNA	Court assumed scraping could possibly contain recoverable DNA (low threshold) but ruled § 8‑201(d)(1)(i) not met because results would not likely be exculpatory
Whether presence of an unknown third‑party DNA on the wrench would be exculpatory	Givens: third‑party DNA would impeach State’s theory that the wrench was the murder weapon	State: wrench was found months later in Givens’s exclusive possession; third‑party DNA could be from later handling and would not tend to show innocence	Held not exculpatory: temporal gap and possession undermine logical link between third‑party DNA and culpability
Whether failure to recover DNA would be exculpatory	Givens: absence of victim’s DNA could challenge State expert testimony	State: jury already heard that testing produced no DNA; continued inability to recover DNA maintains status quo	Held not exculpatory: negative result would not tend to clear Givens or alter evidence the jury already considered

Key Cases Cited

Simms v. State, 445 Md. 163 (explains § 8‑201(d) standards for ordering post‑conviction DNA testing)
Edwards v. State, 453 Md. 174 (factors for when epithelial DNA testing may be exculpatory)
Beaman v. State, 453 Md. 407 (testing that does not logically support innocence fails § 8‑201(d))
Young v. State, 388 Md. 99 (PCR and STR testing principles and admissibility context)
Osborne v. Ohio, 557 U.S. 52 (U.S. Supreme Court on limits of DNA testing to resolve guilt/innocence)
Wallace v. State, 452 Md. 558 (interpretation of statutory “may produce” threshold in § 8‑201(a)(5))
Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698 (STR as generally accepted testing method)
Arrington v. State, 411 Md. 524 (direct appeal pathway under § 8‑201(k)(6))
Phillips v. State, 451 Md. 180 (deference to circuit court fact‑finding)
Washington v. State, 424 Md. 632 (standard for clear‑error review)