2021 IL App (1st) 192434
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background
- Three men (Givens, Dudley, Strong) burglarized an electronics store and fled in a stolen van; police fired approximately 76 rounds as the van burst through the garage door and Strong (front-seat passenger) was killed.
- Givens and Dudley were criminally convicted (felony murder, aggravated battery, theft); convictions were later affirmed.
- The estate of David Strong sued the City for survival, wrongful death, and willful-and-wanton conduct; a jury returned a $1,999,998 verdict for the estate but found Strong 50% at fault and reduced recovery to $999,999.
- The jury answered three court-drafted special interrogatories “No” on (1) whether officers intentionally sought to harm Strong, (2) whether they acted with utter indifference or conscious disregard, and (3) whether officers reasonably believed deadly force was necessary.
- The trial court granted the City’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the special interrogatories and entered judgment for the City; Givens and Dudley’s civil claims had been dismissed on collateral-estoppel grounds from their criminal convictions.
- On appeal the court reinstated the reduced $999,999 verdict for Strong’s estate, reversed the JNOV, and reversed summary judgment against Givens and Dudley (remanding for further proceedings).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Were the special interrogatories proper and, if inconsistent with the general verdict, did they control? | Estate: interrogatories were ambiguous, compound, and could not be reconciled with general verdict; thus they shouldn’t override jury’s damages finding. | City: special findings showed lack of willful-and-wanton conduct and legal justification, so they controlled. | Interrogatories were improperly compound and ambiguous; reasonable hypotheses reconciled answers with the general verdict; special findings did not control. Verdict reinstated (reduced to $999,999). |
| Could the City plead contributory willful-and-wanton conduct (rather than mere negligence) to reduce damages? | Estate: City was required to plead contributory negligence; damages cannot be offset when both parties are charged with willful-and-wanton conduct. | City: comparative-fault principles permit reduction when both parties acted recklessly (reckless W&W can be compared). | Court applied Burke/Ziarko/Poole line: intentional W&W cannot be offset, but reckless W&W may be compared; City’s pleading of contributory W&W was adequate and reduction was permissible because evidence supported reckless conduct by both sides. |
| Did collateral estoppel from the criminal convictions bar Givens and Dudley’s civil claims? | Givens/Dudley: criminal verdicts did not decide civil issues about police justification or officer negligence; no identity of issues. | City: criminal convictions established defendants’ intentional conduct that caused their injuries and precluded civil recovery. | Collateral estoppel did not apply—the criminal trials focused on defendants’ criminal liability, not the civil issues of police justification or degrees of officer fault. Summary judgment for City was reversed. |
| Trial-evidence rulings likely to recur (COPA witnesses, demonstrative animations, willful-and-wanton instruction) | Estate: COPA investigators who found the shooting unjustified should be admissible; willful-and-wanton instruction and contested demonstratives should be allowed/clarified. | City: COPA internal findings and some testimony were irrelevant or prejudicial; animation inaccuracies go to weight, not admissibility. | Court: COPA investigators’ limited testimony is relevant and should not have been barred; animations were admissible as demonstrative evidence (weight/accuracy for jury); plaintiffs may instruct jury on reckless W&W where evidence supports it. |
Key Cases Cited
- Burke v. 12 Rothschild’s Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill. 2d 429 (Ill. 1992) (historic rule: plaintiff negligence cannot be offset against defendant’s willful-and-wanton conduct; distinguished intentional vs. reckless W&W)
- Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267 (Ill. 1994) (distinguishes reckless W&W from intentional W&W; reckless W&W may be compared for contribution)
- Poole v. City of Rolling Meadows, 167 Ill. 2d 41 (Ill. 1995) (after Ziarko, whether damages may be reduced depends on whether defendant’s W&W was intentional or reckless)
- Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494 (Ill. 1967) (standard for judgment notwithstanding the verdict)
- American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d 378 (Ill. 2000) (collateral estoppel principles regarding criminal convictions and civil consequences)
- Leonardi v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83 (Ill. 1995) (more than one actor may be responsible in civil tort despite criminal findings)