810 F.3d 103
1st Cir.2016Background
- Giroux executed a mortgage and note in 2007; the mortgage was later assigned to Fannie Mae.
- Giroux sued in New Hampshire state court (Belknap Superior Court) in 2011 alleging defendants lacked rights to enforce the note; that suit was dismissed for lack of standing and the decision affirmed by the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
- A foreclosure sale was set for January 7, 2014. Giroux filed a new suit in state court on January 6, 2014 to enjoin the sale; that action was removed to federal court.
- The federal district court dismissed Giroux’s federal action as barred by res judicata, reasoning her claims could have been raised in the earlier Belknap proceeding.
- Giroux moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to vacate the dismissal, asserting (1) newly discovered evidence about a missing Paragraph 22 notice, (2) fraud/misconduct, and (3) entitlement to relief under the Rule 60(b)(6) catch‑all; the district court denied the motion in a one‑word order.
- The First Circuit affirmed, holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying Rule 60 relief and that Ungar did not require a written multi‑factor explanation here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ungar required the district court to explain denial of Rule 60 motion | Giroux: Ungar mandates a reasoned analysis and the court must explain denial | Fannie Mae: Ungar is limited to willful defaults and does not impose a categorical writing requirement | Court: Ungar inapposite; no requirement that district court provide detailed written reasons and summary denials are permissible |
| Rule 60(b)(2): newly discovered evidence (Paragraph 22 notice) | Giroux: Postjudgment evidence shows Paragraph 22 notice was missing and supports vacatur | Defendants: Giroux knew of the missing notice during earlier proceedings; new evidence is cumulative | Court: Denial affirmed—evidence was known earlier and cumulative; Rule 60(b)(2) not satisfied |
| Rule 60(b)(3): fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct | Giroux: Proceeding without Paragraph 22 notice shows fraudulent/illegal foreclosure | Defendants: Allegations are conclusory and not litigation‑related misconduct | Court: Denial affirmed—no clear and convincing evidence of litigation‑related fraud or prejudice to Giroux’s ability to present her case |
| Rule 60(b)(6): extraordinary relief / equitable discretion | Giroux: Ungar illustrates discretionary relief should be available; res judicata bar should be reviewed | Defendants: Res judicata applies under New Hampshire law; no extraordinary circumstances | Court: Denial affirmed—no exceptional circumstances warranting Rule 60(b)(6) relief; cannot use Rule 60 as substitute for appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 599 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010) (limits on categorical bars to Rule 60 relief and scope of multi‑factor analysis)
- Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2002) (standards and burden for obtaining Rule 60(b) relief)
- Ojeda-Toro v. Rivera-Méndez, 853 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1988) (review limited to Rule 60 motion denial; Rule 60 cannot substitute for appeal)
- Bouret-Echevarría v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., 784 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2015) (high threshold for Rule 60(b)(6) and balancing finality)
- Lepore v. Vidockler, 792 F.2d 272 (1st Cir. 1986) (summary denial of Rule 60(b) may be affirmed where record supports result)
- Morón-Barradas v. Dep’t of Educ. of the Commonwealth of P.R., 488 F.3d 472 (1st Cir. 2007) (new evidence that is merely cumulative does not warrant Rule 60(b)(2) relief)
- U.S. Steel v. M. DeMatteo Constr. Co., 315 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2002) (Rule 60(b)(2) requires evidence not merely cumulative or impeaching)
- Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988) (fraud standard for Rule 60(b)(3) and requirement of showing prejudice to full litigation)
- Roger Edwards, LLC v. Fiddes & Son Ltd., 427 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2005) (Rule 60(b)(3) focuses on litigation‑related fraud)
- Torromeo v. Town of Fremont, N.H., 438 F.3d 113 (1st Cir. 2006) (preclusive effect of state court judgment determined by state res judicata law)