Girard v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
0:20-cv-01905
| D.S.C. | May 25, 2021Background
- Plaintiff Amy Girard applied for SSI (and sought DIB; DLI Dec. 31, 2020) with an alleged onset of April 1, 2015; application filed Sept. 11, 2015.
- ALJ found severe mental impairments: borderline personality disorder, depression, anxiety, PTSD, and schizoaffective disorder; RFC: full exertional capacity but limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks.
- ALJ discounted Girard’s subjective symptom testimony in part because medical records showed symptom improvement with medication and because of episodes of noncompliance with treatment.
- At Step 5 the ALJ concluded Girard was not disabled and identified representative jobs she could perform; Appeals Council denied review.
- On judicial review, Girard argued the ALJ failed to apply the "special technique" for mental impairments, omitted limitations from the Paragraph B analysis in the RFC, and improperly evaluated her subjective complaints, especially by relying on medication noncompliance without considering that noncompliance can be a symptom of mental illness.
- Magistrate Judge Paige J. Gossett recommended reversal and remand, holding the ALJ erred by failing to consider whether Girard’s treatment noncompliance was caused by her mental impairments, thereby undermining the credibility finding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ALJ properly evaluated subjective symptoms | Girard: ALJ improperly discounted symptoms, relying on noncompliance and daily activities without considering mental-illness causes of noncompliance | Commissioner: ALJ reasonably relied on records showing improvement with treatment and lack of objective support for disabling symptoms | Remand — ALJ failed to consider that noncompliance may be symptom of mental illness; credibility finding not supported by substantial evidence |
| Whether ALJ considered medication/treatment noncompliance as symptom | Girard: ALJ should have analyzed reasons for noncompliance (e.g., impairment-driven) per SSR 16-3p and precedent | Commissioner: ALJ permissibly relied on lack of compliance and improvement when compliant | Remand — error: ALJ did not discuss whether noncompliance was caused by mental impairment |
| Whether RFC omitted Paragraph B limitations | Girard: RFC did not reflect limitations found in Paragraph B functional analysis | Commissioner: RFC captured functional limits sufficiently (simple, routine tasks) | Not reached on merits — remand made further analysis appropriate |
| Whether ALJ followed special technique for mental impairments | Girard: ALJ failed to follow required analysis steps for mental impairments | Commissioner: ALJ applied the sequential evaluation and summarized medical evidence | Not addressed in detail — remand for further consideration may render this moot |
Key Cases Cited
- Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585 (4th Cir. 1996) (establishes two-step test for evaluating pain/subjective symptoms)
- Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148 (2019) (defines "substantial evidence" standard)
- Arakas v. Comm'r, 983 F.3d 83 (4th Cir. 2020) (reversed where ALJ improperly discounted subjective complaints based on lack of objective corroboration)
- Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2011) (noncompliance with psychiatric meds may be result of the disorder; ALJs must consider alternative explanations)
- Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935 (8th Cir. 2009) (noncompliance with psychiatric medication often stems from the impairment and should not automatically discredit claims)
- Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1973) (claimant bears burden to prove disability)
- Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2012) (court will not reweigh evidence or make credibility determinations on review)
