Giovani Najera Moreno v. Merrick Garland, 14-70445

Background

Petitioner Giovani Antonio Najera Moreno is a Mexican native and Legal Permanent Resident challenging a BIA final removal order that denied cancellation of removal and motions to suppress and to terminate proceedings.
The Immigration Judge denied cancellation of removal because Najera Moreno had not accrued seven years of continuous physical presence; the IJ treated receipt of a Notice to Appear (NTA) as a stop-time event, and the BIA affirmed by incorporation.
After briefing on Najera Moreno’s BIA appeal, the Supreme Court and related precedent clarified the law governing what constitutes a proper NTA for stop-time purposes.
Najera Moreno also sought administrative closure relief that he did not present to the BIA; he relies in part on the OPPM 13-01 memorandum, which the court found did not alter the availability of administrative closure previously.
He challenged post–reentry questioning on grounds that immigration authorities failed to provide 8 C.F.R. §287.3(c) notifications and that his statements were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment/Miranda.
The Ninth Circuit: denied claims about 287.3(c) and Miranda, dismissed the administrative-closure claim for lack of jurisdiction, and granted remand on the cancellation-of-removal stop-time issue for the BIA to reconsider under intervening precedent.

Issues

Issue	Najera Moreno's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether receipt of NTA stopped accrual of continuous physical presence for cancellation of removal	NTA did not trigger stop-time under intervening case law; he should get remand for reconsideration	NTA receipt was a stop-time event; IJ and BIA were correct to deny cancellation	Court granted remand to BIA to reconsider cancellation in light of intervening decisions (e.g., Niz-Chavez)
Whether court should remand for administrative closure	Najera Moreno sought administrative closure and contends it was available; OPPM 13-01 supports relief	He did not raise administrative closure before the BIA; OPPM did not change the legal regime	Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because issue was not presented to the BIA
Whether immigration authorities were required to give §287.3(c) notifications before post‑reentry questioning	He argues officers failed to provide required §287.3(c) warnings, so statements/suppression warranted	He was not in formal removal proceedings when questioned, so §287.3(c) did not apply	Denied — §287.3(c) notifications were not required because he had not been placed in formal proceedings
Whether his statements were suppressed under the Fifth Amendment/Miranda	He contends statements were compelled and Miranda protections apply	Miranda remedies apply only in criminal cases; constitutional protection against self-incrimination exists but Miranda exclusion does not extend here	Denied — Fifth Amendment self-incrimination protection acknowledged, but Miranda exclusionary remedy does not apply in these immigration proceedings

Key Cases Cited

Alaelua v. I.N.S., 45 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1995) (treats IJ’s reasons as BIA’s when BIA incorporates IJ opinion)
Alcaraz v. I.N.S., 384 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2004) (remand when intervening authority alters applicable law)
Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021) (clarified what constitutes a sufficient Notice to Appear for stop-time purposes)
Garcia-DeLeon v. Garland, 999 F.3d 986 (6th Cir. 2021) (discusses historical availability of administrative closure)
Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2010) (limits judicial review to issues presented to the BIA)
Samayoa-Martinez v. Holder, 558 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2009) (§287.3(c) notifications apply only after placement in formal proceedings)
United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998) (noncitizens have Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination)
United States v. Solano-Godines, 120 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1997) (Miranda exclusionary rule is for criminal cases)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishes custodial interrogation warnings)