GILREATH v. SMITH Et Al.
340 Ga. App. 265
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Gilreath, a professional pet sitter with ~9 years' experience but no rooster-specific training, agreed to pet-sit for Bruce and Jodi Smith, including feeding chickens kept in a coop.
- The Smiths kept a rooster named Sam, who had previously chased and struck Jodi Smith’s mother and had attacked Jodi; the Smiths did not disclose those specific prior attacks to Gilreath.
- Prior to the injury, the Smiths had warned Gilreath on multiple occasions that the “rooster will attack” and advised using a garbage-can lid as protection; Gilreath admitted the warnings conveyed danger and she chose to accept the job.
- While performing the April 2014 job and opening the coop door, Gilreath was attacked by Sam, suffering deep leg wounds and subsequent serious infections.
- Gilreath sued under common-law premises liability (OCGA § 51-3-1), the dangerous/vicious animal statute (OCGA § 51-2-7), and a Roswell city ordinance; the trial court granted summary judgment for the Smiths based on assumption of the risk.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding Gilreath had actual knowledge of the specific danger, appreciated the risk, and voluntarily exposed herself to it; no evidence showed the Smiths had superior knowledge of the specific risk of infection or greater danger.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gilreath assumed the risk of injury | Gilreath argues she would not have accepted the job if she had known the rooster had actually attacked people and caused serious harm | Smiths argue they warned her the rooster “will attack,” she had equal knowledge, and she voluntarily accepted the task | Court: Assumption of the risk established; summary judgment affirmed |
| Whether Smiths had superior knowledge making OCGA § 51-2-7 applicable | Gilreath contends Smiths knew of rooster’s vicious propensity and should be liable | Smiths contend they did not know of any greater danger (e.g., infection risk) than what they warned | Court: No evidence of superior knowledge; summary judgment for Smiths |
| Whether Smiths engaged in careless management of the animal | Gilreath claims asking a sitter to tend chickens including a known-attacking rooster was careless | Smiths say they kept the rooster in a coop and warned Gilreath of the risk and precautions | Court: Warnings and housing in a coop negated careless-management claim |
| Whether Roswell ordinance was violated | Gilreath alleges ordinance violation supported liability | Smiths note lack of proof of ordinance; plaintiff failed to introduce certified copy | Court: Claim fails for failure to prove the ordinance |
Key Cases Cited
- Ansley v. Raczka–Long, 293 Ga. 138 (2013) (summary-judgment standard; review de novo)
- Home Builders Assn. of Savannah v. Chatham County, 276 Ga. 243 (2003) (summary-judgment principles)
- Bodymasters Sports Indus. v. Wimberley, 232 Ga. App. 170 (1998) (assumption-of-risk elements)
- Griffiths v. Schafer, 223 Ga. App. 560 (1996) (assumption of the risk is knowledge plus intelligent acquiescence)
- Lundy v. Stuhr, 185 Ga. App. 72 (1987) (warning that dog "will bite" supports assumption-of-risk/special caution)
- Farmer v. Brannan Auto Parts, 231 Ga. App. 353 (1998) (prior warning can support summary judgment)
- The Landings Assoc. v. Williams, 291 Ga. 397 (2012) (liability grounded in proprietor’s superior knowledge of perilous instrumentality)
- Durham v. Mason, 256 Ga. App. 467 (2002) (owner entitled to summary judgment absent proof of superior knowledge of animal’s temperament)
- Sutton v. Sutton, 145 Ga. App. 22 (1978) (distinguishing cases where owner failed to warn invitee of known peril)
- Shepard v. Streetman, 198 Ga. App. 474 (1991) (employer’s duty not to assign work creating unreasonable risk; distinguished on facts)
