Gillpatrick v. Sabatka-Rine
297 Neb. 880
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Two inmates, Paul Gillpatrick (NSP) and Niccole Wetherell (NCCW), sought to marry but the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services refused to transport inmates between facilities or recognize telephonic/videoconference ceremonies based on an interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-109 and internal policy (AR 208.01).
- The inmates filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, amended to sue three state officials (Sabatka‑Rine, Skrobecki, Kenney) in their individual capacities only, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel accommodation (including videoconference ceremonies).
- The district court granted summary judgment to the inmates on their § 1983 claim, held the Department’s interpretation of § 42-109 unconstitutional under Turner v. Safley, and enjoined the officials and agents from denying videoconference marriages or enforcing the challenged policy.
- The officials appealed; they argued (inter alia) lack of jurisdiction, sovereign immunity concerns, and that injunctive relief is improper where defendants were sued only in their individual capacities.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, the merits but reversed because the inmates had sued officials only in their individual capacities and injunctive relief to compel compliance with federal law is available only against officials sued in their official capacities.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court’s order was appealable despite attorney‑fee request | Gillpatrick: order on merits is final; fee claim is collateral under § 1988 so appealable now | Officials: silence on fees made order nonfinal under state law (Olson, Murray) | Court: § 1988 governs § 1983 suits; fee entitlement is collateral and need not be requested pre‑judgment; merits order is appealable |
| Whether inmates could obtain injunctive relief when officials were sued only in their individual capacities | Inmates: seek prospective relief to vindicate federal right to marry; Ex parte Young permits injunctive relief | Officials: individual‑capacity suits cannot be sources of Ex parte Young relief; injunction against individuals won’t bind the State | Court: Injunctive relief to compel state compliance with federal law is available only against officials sued in their official capacities; injunction against individuals was erroneous |
| Whether Department’s interpretation of § 42‑109 and policy impermissibly burdened the right to marry | Inmates: § 42‑109 does not forbid videoconference marriages; policy lacked penological justification under Turner | Officials: statute requires physical presence; policy reasonable to avoid facilitating unlawful marriages | Court (assumed but did not decide on merits): even if correct on merits, injunction vacated for capacity defect |
| Whether sovereign immunity or APA/UDJA procedural defects barred relief | Officials: sovereign immunity and pleading/formalities (failure to name Dept., wrong declaratory vehicle) | Inmates: prospective relief against officials and challenge to statutory interpretation survives; not seeking relief that compels expenditure of public funds | Court: sovereign immunity not a bar to prospective relief against officials in their official capacities, but procedural pleading errors irrelevant to § 1983 injunctive capacity issue |
Key Cases Cited
- Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state officials sued in official capacity are not "persons" for § 1983 damages claims)
- Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (liability under § 1983 depends on capacity sued; individual‑capacity suits can impose personal liability)
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (11th Amendment does not bar suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials enforcing unconstitutional laws)
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (prison regulation restricting inmate-to-inmate marriage tested under reasonableness standard balancing penological interests)
- White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445 (1982) (attorney‑fee requests under § 1988 are collateral to merits and not governed by ordinary postjudgment motion time limits)
- Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (11th Amendment bars suits against states unless exception applies)
- Kilgore v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 277 Neb. 456 (2009) (failure to dispose of attorney‑fee request can render judgment nonfinal under state practice)