Gillpatrick v. Sabatka-Rine
297 Neb. 880
Neb.2017Background
- Two incarcerated Nebraska inmates (Gillpatrick and Wetherell) sought to marry but were denied by Department of Correctional Services policy that it will not transport inmates between facilities and that Nebraska law (§ 42-109) requires physical presence before an officiant.
- The inmates sued state officials (warden and director) in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state-law claims, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (and attorney fees).
- The district court granted the inmates summary judgment on the § 1983 claim, concluding the Department’s interpretation of § 42-109 improperly burdened the fundamental right to marry and enjoined the officials from denying videoconference marriages.
- The state officials appealed, arguing among other things that (1) the district court’s order was not final because attorney fees remained pending, and (2) injunctive relief cannot be granted against officials sued only in their individual capacities.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court assumed without deciding the merits, held the judgment was appealable (because § 1988 governs fee timing in § 1983 cases), but reversed because injunctive relief in § 1983 is available only against officials sued in their official capacities.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court’s order was a final, appealable judgment despite attorney fees being unresolved | Kilgore: silence on fees may make order non-final; inmates argued fee request was pending but § 1988 controls timing | Defendants: under Olson/Murray, silence should be treated as denial if no separate pre-judgment fee motion | Court: appealable — in § 1983 cases federal § 1988 governs and fee requests need not be made before judgment; merits ruling was appealable |
| Whether injunctive relief under § 1983 may be awarded against officials sued only in their individual capacities | Inmates: sought prospective relief to vindicate right to marry; relief available against officials who enforce policy | Officials: plaintiffs sued individuals, not official-capacity defendants; sovereign-immunity principles limit relief | Court: injunctive (prospective) relief to compel compliance with federal law is available only against officials sued in their official capacities; injunction against individuals was improper |
| Whether Ex parte Young exception permits injunctive relief against officials in their individual capacities | Inmates: Ex parte Young allows prospective relief to stop enforcement of unconstitutional policies | Officials: Ex parte Young applies to official-capacity suits; individual-capacity suits impose personal liability and do not implicate 11th Amendment | Court: Ex parte Young exception targets official-capacity suits; it does not justify injunctive relief against defendants sued solely in their individual capacities |
| Whether the Department’s interpretation of § 42-109 and its no-transport policy violated inmates’ constitutional right to marry under Turner balancing | Inmates: policy lacked penological justification and was an exaggerated response under Turner v. Safley | Officials: policy based on statutory interpretation of § 42-109 and legitimate resource/security concerns | Court: did not decide merits on appeal; district court had ruled for inmates on Turner analysis but Nebraska Supreme Court reversed on capacity grounds and remanded to vacate injunction |
Key Cases Cited
- Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (official-capacity suits are treated as suits against the office/state and are not "persons" for § 1983 damages)
- Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (liability under § 1983 depends on capacity sued; individuals can be sued in personal capacity for damages)
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (11th Amendment does not bar suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief to stop enforcement of unconstitutional laws)
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (standard for evaluating when a prison regulation infringes inmates’ constitutional rights)
- White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445 (1982) (attorney-fee requests under § 1988 are collateral to the merits and not subject to ordinary postjudgment motion time limits)
- Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (11th Amendment bars suits against states unless waived; distinction between official-capacity relief and state liability)