Gillman v. Gillman
2021 UT 33
| Utah | 2021Background
- Decedents created trusts for their children; four cousins sued two uncle beneficiaries alleging trust mismanagement, unjust enrichment, and seeking accounting and declaratory relief.
- Uncles moved to dismiss (or for summary judgment); the court converted the motion to summary judgment and ordered discovery; the cousins were ordered to submit an order memorializing that decision.
- Counsel for the uncles (Curtis) delayed; the court entered the cousins’ proposed order on January 16, 2019, making the uncles’ answer due January 30. The uncles did not file an answer and the clerk entered a default on February 15.
- The cousins moved for default judgment; within days the uncles opposed and moved to set aside the default certificate under Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c), attaching an affidavit and a proposed answer asserting meritorious defenses.
- The district court considered factors (willfulness, meritorious defenses, promptness, prejudice, public interest), found good cause, set aside the default certificate, and denied default judgment. The cousins appealed; the Utah Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Meaning of “good cause” under Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c) | Good cause requires a showing that the default was caused by some external event, exigency, or other cause beyond the party’s own inaction. | Rule 55(c) requires the movant to show why the default certificate should be set aside; no textual threshold requiring external cause. | Court: Rejected plaintiff’s reading; “good cause” is flexible and requires a showing sufficient to persuade the court to vacate the default, not proof of an external cause. |
| 2. Whether Roth/Pierucci factors form a mandatory test | Those appellate factors must be applied as a threshold test to set aside default. | The factors are relevant guidance, not a rigid, mandatory test; courts may consider any relevant circumstances. | Court: Factors can be relevant but do not constitute a mandatory test; district courts have broad equitable discretion. |
| 3. Relation between Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b)(1) excusable neglect | Standard for vacating a default certificate is the same as excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). | Rule 55(c) imposes a lower, more flexible standard than Rule 60(b)(1). | Court: 55(c) is a lower standard; 60(b)(1) (excusable neglect) is more stringent and has additional restraints. |
| 4. Whether the district court abused its discretion in this case | Uncles offered only counsel inaction; that is insufficient as a matter of law to show good cause, so vacatur was an abuse. | Uncles and counsel were otherwise active in the case, sought new litigation counsel, opposed default promptly, and alleged meritorious defenses. | Court: Affirmed district court—no abuse of discretion; findings adequate and equitable considerations supported vacatur. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000) (standard of review: abuse of discretion for setting aside default).
- Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1998) (entry of default requires only failure to answer timely).
- Jones v. Layton/Okland, 214 P.3d 859 (Utah 2009) (excusable neglect under Rule 60(b) requires diligence).
- Sewell v. Xpress Lube, 321 P.3d 1080 (Utah 2013) (discussion of excusable neglect standard).
- Roth v. Joseph, 244 P.3d 391 (Utah Ct. App. 2010) (identifies factors relevant to setting aside a default).
- Pierucci v. U.S. Bank, NA, 347 P.3d 837 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (applies and discusses similar factors).
- Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981) (preference for adjudication on the merits).
- Erickson v. Schenkers Int’l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994) (courts should be liberal in granting relief against defaults to decide cases on the merits).