Gillis v. Chase
894 F.3d 1
1st Cir.2018Background
- In 2008 Gillis, while backing a truck, struck and killed Edward Hansen; Gillis was criminally charged with motor vehicle homicide and later acquitted.
- Gillis I: In 2011 Gillis sued Westwood Police Chief William Chase and Norfolk County DA William Keating under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging prosecution without probable cause; the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim and prosecutorial immunity for Keating.
- Gillis II: In 2012 Gillis sued Norton officials; that case proceeded to discovery and was dismissed on summary judgment, affirmed on appeal.
- Gillis III: In 2016 Gillis filed a new federal complaint against Chase, invoking Rule 60 to reopen Gillis I based on evidence allegedly uncovered in Gillis II that Chase conspired with Norton Chief Clark to influence the prosecution.
- The district court dismissed Gillis III as time-barred under Rule 60(b)/(c) and not a proper independent equity action under Rule 60(d), found no fraud on the court, and held the § 1983 claim failed to state a due process/probable-cause theory.
- The First Circuit affirmed, concluding the Rule 60 one-year/time-reasonable limits barred relief, Gillis did not satisfy the narrow equity/fraud-on-the-court standards, and the complaint did not plausibly allege lack of probable cause or a viable § 1983 claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gillis' Rule 60(b) motion/time-based relief is timely | Gillis argued newly discovered evidence from Gillis II justified relief from dismissal of Gillis I | Chase argued the Rule 60(b) one-year limit and the requirement to file within a reasonable time bar the motion | Court: Dismissal affirmed; Rule 60(b) claims untimely (filed >1 year and not within a reasonable time) |
| Whether an independent equitable action under Rule 60(d)(1) is available | Gillis contended Rule 60(d)(1) permits an independent action to remedy a grave miscarriage of justice based on new evidence | Chase contended Rule 60(d)(1) is not an affirmative grant and standards for independent relief are unmet | Court: Gillis did not meet the high threshold for an independent equitable action; claim fails |
| Whether allegations constitute fraud on the court under Rule 60(d)(3) | Gillis alleged misconduct (conspiracy/influence) that affected the original proceeding | Chase argued fraud-on-the-court requires interference with the judicial process itself (e.g., bribery) and Gillis' allegations do not qualify | Court: No fraud on the court; Rule 60(d)(3) not satisfied |
| Whether Gillis stated a § 1983 due process claim for prosecution without probable cause | Gillis claimed Chase helped induce prosecution absent probable cause, warranting relief | Chase pointed to a state magistrate’s probable-cause finding and that charging decisions need not mirror trial outcomes; Devenpeck limits relevance of others' state of mind | Court: Complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim; probable-cause showing at the charging/hearing stage and legal precedent defeat claim |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38 (1998) (Rule 60(d)(1) does not create new equitable power; independent actions are narrow)
- Bouret-Echevarría v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., 784 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2015) (Rule 60 reasonable-time standard and timeliness precedents)
- Fontanillas-Lopez v. Morell Bauzá Cartagena & Dapena, LLC, 832 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2016) (independent-equity-action standard; grave miscarriage of justice)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) (charging probable-cause inquiry and irrelevance of an officer’s subjective motive)
- Roger Edwards, LLC v. Fiddes & Son Ltd., 427 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2005) (fraud-on-the-court requires interference with judicial process)
- Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988) (limits on Rule 60(b)(6) and scope of equitable relief)
- Mitchell v. Rees, 651 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2011) (discussion of independent equitable relief under Rule 60(d))