258 P.3d 118
Alaska2011Background
- Gillis sought a state land purchase preference under AS 38.05.035(f) after a 25-year lease for five acres.
- DNR conveyed Gillis’s leased land to Aleutians East Borough in 2005 and transferred interest in Gillis’s lease to the Borough.
- Gillis offered to purchase the land in 2005; Borough rejected and proposed a new lease.
- Gillis claimed eligibility in 2007 and 2008 for the preference right, arguing land entry predated statehood.
- Superior court held AS 38.05.035(f) requires entry of the land while under federal ownership before state selection; granted summary judgment for Borough and DNR.
- Gillis appealed, challenging plain meaning, legislative history, and regulatory interpretation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does AS 38.05.035(f) require entry on land while under federal ownership? | Gillis contends no federal-entry predicate is required. | Borough/DNR maintain federal-entry is required by statute. | Yes; statute requires entry while land was federally owned. |
| Should AS 38.05.035(f) be read in pari materia with other preference provisions? | Gillis argues for consistent interpretation across provisions. | DNR and court consider textual distinctions; no automatic parity. | Unpersuasive; plain meaning controls; no error in non-pari materia reading. |
| Does legislative history support a narrow, remedial purpose for the statute? | Gillis challenges remediary intent and breadth. | Legislative history shows limited, special-class purpose. | Yes; history supports narrow, remedial interpretation. |
| Should the court defer to DNR's regulation interpreting the statute? | Independent judgment should trump regulatory interpretation. | Longstanding agency interpretation should be respected. | Independent judgment applied; regulation consistent with plain meaning and longstanding practice. |
| Does interpreting the statute to require federal-entry produce absurd results? | Requirement would create an unrealistic, expanding class of applicants. | Absurd results are not warranted; limitation is consistent with intent. | No; narrow, limited class aligns with statutory intent and avoids absurdity. |
Key Cases Cited
- Matanuska-Susitna Borough v. Hammond, 726 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1986) (statutory interpretation of preference rights not dependent on agency expertise)
- Longwith v. State, Dep't of Natural Res., 848 P.2d 257 (Alaska 1992) (interpretation of preference rights and administrative judgment considerations)
- City & Borough of Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1979) (principles of statutory interpretation and precedent)
- Sherbahn v. Kerkove, 987 P.2d 195 (Alaska 1999) (absent absurd results, avoid null interpretations)
- Premera Blue Cross v. State, Dep't of Commerce, Cmty. & Econ. Dev., Div. of Ins., 171 P.3d 1110 (Alaska 2007) (considerations in statutory interpretation and rational result)
- Bartley v. State, Dep't of Admin., Teachers' Ret. Bd., 110 P.3d 1254 (Alaska 2005) (agency interpretations and deference in statutory context)