Gill v. Gill
50 So. 3d 772
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2010Background
- Krystal Gill filed an April 2009 petition for protection against domestic violence against Daniel Gill, alleging a February 2008 pushing incident and an April 2009 shouting incident in her driveway; no contemporaneous acts were alleged after April 2009 and the parties were living separately with a prior injunction against Gill in place against Krystal Gill.
- At the evidentiary hearing, Krystal testified to a driveway confrontation with Gill in which he remained in his car; she did not testify to Gill leaving the car or committing additional violence, and Gill largely corroborated her account.
- B.G., the couple’s child, testified that Gill had punched and slapped her several days before the April 2009 incident; she showed injuries and Krystal offered blurry photos, but the photos were not useful.
- Gill sought to call a witness who would testify that B.G. appeared fine that night, but the court refused to admit testimony from that witness.
- The trial court granted a permanent injunction against Gill, without considering Gill’s proffered testimony, and without independently establishing that Krystal satisfied the statutory requirements for an injunction.
- The trial court later acknowledged it acted in frustration and entered a mutual injunction, but the court is prohibited from issuing mutual orders unless each party independently meets the statutory requirements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether there was legally sufficient evidence of domestic violence or imminent danger | Gill argues the petition and hearing showed violence and fear sufficient for relief. | Gill contends the evidence did not prove actual violence or a reasonable fear of imminent violence. | No; evidence was legally insufficient for an injunction. |
| Whether the court properly issued a mutual injunction | Gill asserts the injunction should stand as protective relief for Krystal only if supported independently. | Gill argues granting a mutual injunction without independent statutory support was improper. | Yes; mutual injunction improper and vacated. |
| Whether evidence concerning B.G. could support relief for Krystal under these facts | Gill suggests B.G.’s alleged violence could justify protection for Krystal given the relationship. | Gill notes the protection was not sought for B.G. and the evidence does not show Krystal’s reasonable fear. | Not supported; B.G. evidence cannot sustain the injunction for Krystal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. Jones, 32 So.3d 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (isolated prior violence insufficient without current allegations)
- Giallanza v. Giallanza, 787 So.2d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (consider relationship history and current allegations for imminent danger)
- Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (standard for reasonable fear in DV injunctions)
- Oettmeier v. Oettmeier, 960 So.2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (threats to life not enough without violence or credible threat)
- Kopelovich v. Kopelovich, 793 So.2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (threats to cause financial harm not sufficient for injunction)
- Moore v. Pattin, 983 So.2d 663 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (evidence concerning harm to child can support DV injunction for child, not here)
- Martin v. Hickey, 733 So.2d 600 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (mutual injunctions require independent statutory support)