Gill v. City of Milwaukee
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4032
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Feb 2013: Jordin Crawley was shot; detectives identified Eddie Gill from video and interviewed ~20 witnesses. Gill, with known cognitive impairments, voluntarily came to the station Feb 12.
- Initial interview: Gill gave inconsistent statements, was arrested for obstruction, Mirandized, and requested counsel; detectives ended that interview.
- While in custody Gill sought a polygraph; after polygraph and multiple long interrogations over Feb 12–14 (during which detectives emphasized identification and lied about polygraph/eyewitness ID), Gill — who protested innocence repeatedly — confessed. He was charged with homicide.
- Trial court granted Gill’s motion to suppress the confession, finding he was functionally illiterate, previously found incompetent, and that interrogations were stressful and coercive; murder charge was dismissed.
- Gill sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment coercion, false arrest, Brady, failure to intervene, conspiracy), plus claims against Chief Flynn (supervisory liability) and City of Milwaukee (Monell). District court granted judgment on the pleadings for defendants; appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coerced confession — Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment | Gill: detectives used coercive tactics on a cognitively impaired suspect; right to be free from coercive interrogation was clearly established | Defendants: qualified immunity; no clearly established right particularized to these facts | Court: Qualified immunity; right not clearly established in this Circuit given lack of controlling precedent closely analogous to facts |
| Failure to intervene / conspiracy (re coercion) | Gill: other officers knew or should have known and failed to stop coercion; conspired to obtain confession | Defendants: same qualified immunity and no underlying violation known | Held: Fails because right was not clearly established; related conspiracy/failure-to-intervene claims fail |
| False arrest (murder charge) | Gill: murder charge was a second arrest lacking probable cause because confession was involuntary | Defendants: probable cause existed for original obstruction arrest and continued custody; subsequent murder charge did not create a new arrest | Held: Dismissed — probable cause for initial arrest bars false arrest claim (no intervening release or separate arrest) |
| Brady (failure to disclose witness statements) | Gill: detectives withheld exculpatory witness reports, causing continued pretrial detention | Defendants: Brady requires disclosure in time to be used at trial; delayed disclosure here would still permit use at trial | Held: Dismissed — failure-to-disclose claims fail because Brady is satisfied if evidence is disclosed in time to allow its use at trial; distinct from destruction-of-evidence cases |
| Supervisory (Flynn) and Monell (City) liability | Gill: City custom prioritized convictions over truth; Flynn failed to train and was deliberately indifferent | Defendants: pleadings do not plausibly allege Flynn’s personal involvement or a widespread municipal custom | Held: Dismissed — complaint fails to allege Flynn’s personal participation or facts showing a widespread municipal practice sufficient for Monell liability |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (establishes plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading must permit plausible inference of liability)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (clearly established law cannot be defined at high level of generality)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires policy or custom causing deprivation)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (probable cause for any offense bars false arrest claim on additional charges)
- Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823 (Seventh Circuit: difficulty defining conscience-shocking interrogation; knowledge of disability does not automatically establish due-process violation)
- Armstrong v. Daily, 786 F.3d 529 (distinguishes destruction of evidence from mere nondisclosure under Brady)