317 Conn. 33
Conn.2015Background
- Claimant suffered two separate, compensable work-related knee injuries: left knee (1997) insured by Liberty Mutual, right knee (2002) insured by Chubb.
- Physician recommended bilateral knee replacement; both carriers agreed surgery was necessary and that Chubb would administer payment for surgery with Liberty Mutual reimbursing 50% of surgical costs per a March 10, 2010 agreement.
- Carriers disagreed over how temporary total disability (TTD) benefits under the relapse statute, § 31-307b, should be allocated during the single recovery period after simultaneous bilateral surgery.
- Commissioner found each knee independently would cause TTD at the relapse rate, applied § 31-307b, and ordered Liberty Mutual to reimburse Chubb for 50% of the claimant’s TTD payments.
- The Workers’ Compensation Review Board and the Appellate Court affirmed; Liberty Mutual appealed claiming the commissioner lacked statutory authority to order reimbursement and that appellate bodies erred in interpreting the carriers’ agreement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether commissioner had statutory authority to order one carrier to reimburse another for TTD under § 31-307b | (Chubb) Commissioner could equitably allocate concurrent carrier liability under § 31-278 to avoid double recovery | (Liberty Mutual) No statutory power to order reimbursement between carriers for separate, distinct injuries; Stickney limits implied powers | Court held commissioner had authority to order 50/50 reimbursement given concurrent statutory liability and § 31-278 implied powers |
| Whether commissioner lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve carriers’ dispute | (Chubb) Dispute arises under the Workers’ Compensation Act and is within commissioner’s jurisdiction | (Liberty Mutual) Characterized as an insurance coverage/contract issue outside commissioner’s jurisdiction | Court held commissioner had subject-matter jurisdiction because dispute arose from application of Workers’ Compensation provisions |
| Whether apportionment precedent barred reimbursement when injuries are separate and distinct | (Liberty Mutual) Precedent precludes apportionment between carriers for separate injuries (citing Hatt) | (Chubb) Facts are sui generis: concurrent liability for postsurgery TTD; precedent not on point | Court distinguished precedent and found the factual scenario unique, permitting equitable split |
| Whether board/Appellate Court erred in interpreting carriers’ March 10, 2010 agreement or harmless error | (Liberty Mutual) Board improperly read “incidental expenses” to include TTD; Appellate Court erred in treating any misreading as harmless | (Chubb) Even without relying on agreement language, commissioner’s order stood on statutory authority and remedial purpose | Court found the board misinterpreted that phrase but the error was harmless because the award was independently supported by commissioner’s statutory authority |
Key Cases Cited
- Stickney v. Sunlight Construction, Inc., 248 Conn. 754 (1999) (distinguishes commissioner jurisdiction where dispute is purely insurance coverage/contract law)
- Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 263 Conn. 279 (2003) (limits employer/carrier liability where separate and distinct later injury causes disability)
- Enquist v. General Datacom, 218 Conn. 19 (1991) (articulates policy against double recovery in workers’ compensation)
- Deschenes v. Transco, Inc., 288 Conn. 303 (2008) (standard of review and deference to commissioner/board interpretations)
- Leonetti v. MacDermid, Inc., 310 Conn. 195 (2013) (limits § 31-298 to hearing procedures, not substantive relief)