Gill, Ex Parte Tommy John, 2013 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1689

Background

Tommy and Charlie Gill were arrested for murder on Sept. 1, 2012 and held on multimillion-dollar bail; bail was later reduced to $50,000 each but they remained detained.
More than 90 days after arrest, with the State conceding it was not ready for trial, both filed habeas petitions under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.151 seeking release on personal bond or a reduction of bail to an amount they could make.
At the joint hearing each testified they were indigent, had been in custody since arrest, and could not afford the reduced bail; the trial court found them indigent but denied relief.
The trial court's written conclusions stated that it considered factors in art. 17.15 (including prior convictions and community/victim safety) in denying relief.
The Beaumont court of appeals affirmed, relying on Ex parte Matthews to hold art. 17.15 factors (including victim/community safety) must be considered in art. 17.151 hearings.
The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to resolve whether art. 17.151's mandatory release is subject to art. 17.15 bail-setting factors; it reversed the court of appeals and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether art. 17.151 mandatory-release requirement is constrained by art. 17.15 bail factors	Appellants: art. 17.151's plain mandatory language precludes consideration of other art. 17.15 factors; if State not ready and 90 days passed, release or bail reduction must occur	State: trial courts must apply art. 17.15 rules (including victim/community safety) when deciding art. 17.151 relief; alternatively, art. 17.151 is unconstitutional	Court: art. 17.151's mandatory release operates independently; judges may not deny release by invoking art. 17.15 factors — but may impose conditions under other statutes (e.g., art. 17.40); remanded for relief
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Gills' art. 17.151 petitions	Gills: they proved >90 days detention and State not ready; trial court abused discretion by considering impermissible factors	State: judge properly considered prior convictions, nature of offense, and other circumstances to deny relief	Court: judge abused discretion; record established entitlement under art. 17.151 and denials rested on irrelevant art. 17.15-type considerations
Whether art. 17.151 violates separation-of-powers under Texas Constitution	Gills: statute is a valid legislative directive balancing liberty and public safety; judiciary retains factfinding and conditioning roles	State: statute unconstitutionally usurps judicial discretion by mandating release regardless of case facts	Court: art. 17.151 is constitutional; it does not unduly interfere with judicial functions because judges still determine readiness, custody period, can set bail amount to what accused can make, and impose conditions of release
Proper means to protect victim/community safety when art. 17.151 applies	Gills: mandatory release does not preclude reasonable conditions to protect safety	State: favored using art. 17.15 factors to deny release	Court: safety concerns may be addressed via conditions of bond (e.g., art. 17.40) and by statutory exceptions the Legislature added to art. 17.151; safety cannot be used to nullify art. 17.151's mandatory release

Key Cases Cited

Rowe v. State, 853 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (interpreting art. 17.151 to require release on personal bond or reduction of bail to amount accused can make when State not ready)
Jones v. State, 803 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (legislature may prescribe conditions for release pending trial; addresses separation-of-powers limits)
Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (discusses constitutional limits on legislative control over judicial functions)
Ex parte Spaulding, 612 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (standard that habeas court bail determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion)