Gilbert Aguilar v. Jeanne Woodford
725 F.3d 970
9th Cir.2013Background
- Gilbert Aguilar was convicted of first-degree murder based principally on eyewitness identifications and a police dog (Reilly) scent identification linking Aguilar’s scent to the passenger seat of a white Volkswagen Beetle used in the crime.
- Eyewitness descriptions immediately after the shooting more closely matched another suspect, Richard Osuna (younger and shorter); several witnesses changed or strengthened identifications at trial to point to Aguilar. Osuna was never investigated, and prosecutors instructed police not to pursue that lead.
- The prosecution did not disclose that, months earlier, in a different case the same office had stipulated that Reilly had made prior mistaken scent identifications and a trial court had excluded Reilly’s scent evidence.
- Defense counsel was unaware of the White stipulation or the Los Angeles County Public Defender’s letter urging disclosure; had counsel known, he would have challenged admissibility and not conceded Aguilar had sat in the car.
- The California Court of Appeal found no Brady violation or prejudice; the federal district court denied habeas relief. The Ninth Circuit reversed on the Brady claim and ordered a conditional writ (new trial unless state releases Aguilar).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutor’s failure to disclose Reilly’s history of misidentifications violated Brady | Aguilar: undisclosed evidence was impeaching/exculpatory and would have led to exclusion or impeachment of dog evidence; reasonable probability of different result | State: nondisclosure was immaterial because other evidence (eyewitness IDs) supported conviction | Held: Brady violation; failure to disclose was material and undermined confidence in verdict |
| Whether knowledge of White stipulation is imputable to trial prosecutor | Aguilar: knowledge imputed to DA’s office and to handler; Brady applies to evidence known to others in prosecution team | State: argued (below) that knowledge not attributable to trial prosecutor (not pressed here) | Held: Knowledge imputable — prosecutors must learn favorable evidence known to others; handler and office had notice |
| Materiality/prejudice standard under Brady (reasonable probability of different result) | Aguilar: dog scent was sole corroboration of weak, inconsistent eyewitness IDs; suppression was material | State: dog evidence was not essential or probative of presence on date of murder | Held: Suppressed evidence was material — reasonable probability verdict would differ without un-impeached scent evidence |
| Remedy on federal habeas for Brady violation | Aguilar: conditional writ/new trial required | State: sought to uphold conviction | Held: Grant habeas on Brady claim; conditional writ directing release unless state grants new trial within reasonable time |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose materially exculpatory/impeaching evidence)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (prosecutor must learn of and disclose favorable evidence known to others in the prosecution team; materiality standard)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (Brady three-part framework: favorable, suppressed, material)
- Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867 (2006) (Brady suppression can include evidence known only to investigators)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (harmless-error standard for federal habeas: substantial and injurious effect or influence)
- Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002) (AEDPA standard of review is highly deferential)