Gibraltar Rock, Inc. v. New Hanover Township
118 A.3d 461
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2015Background
- Gibraltar owns ~240 acres in New Hanover Township and obtained a DEP Noncoal Surface Mining Permit (2005) and zoning special exception to operate a quarry; Township previously enjoined mining pending land development approval.
- Gibraltar filed a declaratory judgment action (2013) seeking a declaration that the Township’s Stormwater Management Ordinance (SMO) is preempted by the Pennsylvania Noncoal Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act (Noncoal Act).
- The parties submitted stipulated facts and a one-day bench trial; testimony established DEP oversight and that the Mining Permit included stormwater controls approved by DEP.
- Trial court held sections 16 and 3 of the Noncoal Act expressly preempted the SMO as applied to quarry operations and related site infrastructure (office/scale, entrance, parking), and found conflict between permit requirements and SMO design standards.
- On appeal, this Court determined the Township waived appellate issues by failing to file mandatory post-trial motions but alternatively affirmed on the merits: the SMO is expressly preempted when applied to surface-mining-related activities.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gibraltar) | Defendant's Argument (Township) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the SMO is preempted by the Noncoal Act when applied to quarry operations | SMO regulates stormwater tied to surface mining and is therefore preempted under Noncoal Act §16 and the "surface mining" definition in §3 | SMO is a traditional, neutral land‑use/stormwater regulation required by SWMA and does not specifically regulate mining operations | Held: Expressly preempted when applied to quarry construction/operations and related site infrastructure because those activities fall within the Noncoal Act definition of "surface mining." |
| Effect of SMO’s enabling statute (SWMA vs MPC) on preemption analysis | N/A (focus on preemption) | SMO adoption authority matters; MPC-based ordinances may be excluded from certain preemption language | Held: Irrelevant here because SMO was adopted after the Noncoal Act; the critical inquiry is whether SMO regulates "surface mining." |
| Whether SMO and Mining Permit can coexist (conflict preemption) | N/A (argued SMO should be displaced) | SMO and Mining Permit are compatible; local controls can supplement DEP permit (Township engineer said compliance with both possible) | Held: Because express preemption applies, compatibility is immaterial; court did not need to decide conflict preemption. |
| Temporal distinction — construction-phase vs post‑construction stormwater controls | N/A (argued SMO should apply post‑construction) | SMO should govern permanent, post-construction stormwater measures even if DEP covers construction-phase controls | Held: Noncoal Act’s preemption covers all "surface activity" without a temporal limitation, so post-construction measures related to mining can also be preempted. |
Key Cases Cited
- L.B. Foster Co. v. Lane Enters., 551 Pa. 307, 710 A.2d 55 (Pa. 1998) (post‑trial motion rule required to preserve issues for appeal)
- Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pinkerton, 574 Pa. 333, 830 A.2d 958 (Pa. 2003) (post‑trial declaratory judgment orders are subject to Rule 227.1 post‑trial motion requirements)
- Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Twp. of Conemaugh, 149 Pa. Cmwlth. 22, 612 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (ordinance stormwater provisions regulating quarry runoff were preempted by Noncoal Act)
- Geryville Materials, Inc. v. Planning Comm’n of Lower Milford Twp., 74 A.3d 322 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (neutral land‑use provisions become preempted operational regulations when applied to regulate quarry water issues)
- Hogan, Lepore & Hogan v. Pequea Twp. Zoning Bd., 162 Pa. Cmwlth. 282, 638 A.2d 464 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (interpretation of Noncoal Act preemption relative to MPC)
- Hoffman Mining Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Adams Twp., 612 Pa. 598, 32 A.3d 587 (Pa. 2011) (distinction between express and conflict preemption)
- Warner Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Tredyffrin Twp., 148 Pa. Cmwlth. 609, 612 A.2d 578 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (ordinance regulating reclamation was preempted as connected to mining)
- Diamond Reo Truck Co. v. Mid‑Pac. Indus., 806 A.2d 423 (Pa. Super. 2002) (failure to file post‑trial motion waives appellate issues)