Gibbs v. Primelending
381 S.W.3d 829
| Ark. | 2011Background
- Certified question from the federal district court asking whether the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction comports with Arkansas long-arm law and due process.
- Plaintiffs Morgan Stanley and PrimeLending-related entities involved in a refinancing scheme culminating in multiple mortgages and a misappropriated escrow funds incident with eLender Escrow.
- Defendants Corinthian Title, Brown, Hickson, and Tueckes contended that Arkansas long-arm jurisdiction cannot reach conspirators and that the conspiracy theory violates due process.
- The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the conspiracy theory of jurisdiction does not violate due process or AR long-arm statute §16-4-101(B).
- The court explained the conspiracy theory is compatible with due process and may be used to attribute acts of conspirators to co-conspirators for purposes of jurisdiction.
- The certified question was answered in the negative; jurisdiction may be based on conspiracy-based imputed conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether conspiracy-based in personam jurisdiction complies with due process. | Gibbs/Pls: conspiracy theory valid for jurisdiction. | Corinthian Title et al.: violates due process and long-arm statute. | Constitutionally valid; does not violate due process. |
Key Cases Cited
- World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (U.S. 1980) (minimum contacts and purposeful availment concepts essential to jurisdiction)
- Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (U.S. 1985) (purposeful availment; foreseeing litigation in forum state)
- International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (U.S. 1945) (establishes minimum contacts standard)
- Mason v. Funderburk, 247 Ark. 521, 446 S.W.2d 543 (Ark. 1969) (conspiracy-based liability language informs jurisdictional reach)
- Chenault v. Walker, 36 S.W.3d 45 (Tenn. 2001) (co-conspirator acts may be used against others for liability/jurisdiction)