Gianfrancesco v. Town of Wrentham
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 7021
1st Cir.2013Background
- Gianfrancesco, former owner/operator of Tom's Tavern in Wrentham, sued the Town and officials for federal civil rights violations and Massachusetts Chapter 93A claims.
- He alleged the town imposed excessive, retaliatory regulatory burdens after his criticism of town policies and his opposition to smoking regulations.
- The district court dismissed the §1983 and Chapter 93A claims, leading to this appeal.
- From 1998–2009 Gianfrancesco publicly criticized local regulations; in 2003 he publicly defied smoking ordinances, resulting in state court action.
- Allegations include repeated inspections, information requests, and orders for improvements (septic and sprinkler upgrades) targeted at Tom's Tavern, not rival establishments.
- In early 2009, he claims a Town Administrator urged Tom's Tavern to shut down and the business ultimately closed due to municipal misconduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to sue | Gianfrancesco has Article III standing. | Shareholder-standing bars his claims because injuries occurred to the business. | Gianfrancesco has Article III standing; shareholder-standing barred not dispositive here. |
| Due process claim viability | Pattern of selective enforcement violated substantive due process. | Claims are vague and do not show conscience-shocking abuse. | Claim fails; allegations are too vague to show shocking, egregious conduct. |
| Equal protection (class-of-one) viability | Tom's Tavern treated differently from a similarly situated business (Anvil Pub). | Comparator is inadequately pled; no plausible similarly situated identified. | Class-of-one claim not plausibly pled; no adequate comparator shown. |
| Chapter 93A merits | Chapter 93A violated due to unfair or deceptive acts. | Not challenged; court should not address given lack of challenge. | Not addressed on appeal because not challenged below. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (constitutional standing requirements)
- DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (standing requires concrete injury likely to be redressed)
- Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 493 U.S. 334 (1990) (prudential standing; corporate standing analysis)
- Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (standing—assert own rights; not third-party)
- Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (prudential standing components)
- Iqbal (Ashcroft v. Iqbal), 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ( plausibility standard for pleading)
- Harron v. Town of Franklin, 660 F.3d 531 (1st Cir. 2011) (substantive due process pleading requires shock to conscience)
- Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (class-of-one equal protection standard)
- Menard v. CSX Transp., Inc., 698 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2012) (need for adequately pled comparators in class-of-one claims)
- Rectrix Aerodrome Ctrs., Inc. v. Barnstable Mun. Airport Comm'n, 610 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2010) (class-of-one comparator sufficiency)
- Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2005) (economic harm as standing injury)
- SBT Holdings, LLC v. Town of Westminster, 547 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2008) (standing via injury to business)
- Barrington Cove Ltd. P'ship v. R.I. Hous. & Mortg. Fin. Corp., 246 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001) (pleading sufficiency for business plaintiffs)