Ghyslaine Mendez Belmonte, s/k/a Ghyslaine Mendez-Belmonte v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 0889204

Mendez Belmonte pled guilty on September 19, 2019 to felony hit-and-run and a reduced misdemeanor driving-on-suspended-license; the trial court conducted an extensive plea colloquy and entered conviction orders October 4, 2019.
A later, separate negotiated paper proposed a more favorable disposition (allowing withdrawal of the felony plea after probation); parties discussed modifying the original deal before sentencing.
At a February 28, 2020 conference the parties and the trial court agreed the new paper would operate as a sentencing recommendation (not a new binding plea agreement); parties confirmed that understanding and deferred sentencing to prepare the recommendation in writing.
At the March 13, 2020 sentencing hearing the court treated the second document as a recommendation and rejected it, imposing an active term on the felony conviction and suspending portions of the sentence.
On May 12, 2020 Mendez Belmonte moved to withdraw her guilty plea post-sentencing, arguing manifest injustice because the court mischaracterized the second agreement and she was not given a chance to withdraw; the trial court denied the motion.
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the record showed the original plea was voluntary, the second paper was a nonbinding recommendation by the parties, and Mendez Belmonte failed to show the ‘‘manifest injustice’’ required to withdraw a plea post-sentence.

Issue	Mendez Belmonte's Argument	Commonwealth's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court erred by denying a post-sentence motion to withdraw plea (manifest injustice standard)	Court mischaracterized a new plea modification as a sentencing recommendation, depriving her of the chance to withdraw under the less stringent pre-sentencing standard	Original plea had been accepted; the second paper was a recommendation; no involuntariness or innocence shown	Affirmed—no manifest injustice; plea was voluntarily entered and second paper was a recommendation
Whether the original guilty plea was involuntary	Implied claim that reliance on a new agreement entitled her to withdraw (she did not assert involuntariness at colloquy)	Plea colloquy shows she knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty and understood sentencing was not promised	Court found plea knowingly and voluntarily entered; no challenge to voluntariness sustained
Whether failure to give Rule 3A:8(c)(2) instruction required reversal	Argued court should have instructed about inability to withdraw if court rejects recommendation	Rule 3A:8(c)(2) applies when plea is conditioned on a recommendation; here the plea was separate from the recommendation	Instruction not required under these facts; claim unpersuasive

Velazquez v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 603 (2016) (discusses review for abuse of discretion and treatment of plea-withdrawal admissions)
Brown v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 295 (2019) (distinguishes pre- and post-sentencing standards; post-sentence requires manifest injustice)
Lilly v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 960 (1978) (explains manifest injustice standard aims to prevent plea withdrawals based on sentence disappointment)
Johnson v. Anis, 284 Va. 462 (2012) (definition of "manifest")
Howell v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 737 (2012) (manifest injustice examples: involuntary plea or rescinded plea agreement)
Tooke v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 759 (2006) (court examines record for affirmative evidence of innocence or lack of offense)
Parris v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 321 (1949) (abuse-of-discretion standard for plea-withdrawal rulings)
Cobbins v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 28 (2008) (pre-sentencing withdrawal requires proffer showing reasonable basis to contest guilt)