Ghostanyans v. Goodwin
191 N.E.3d 63
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background
- Plaintiffs (Christine and Tadeh Ghostanyans, on behalf of their son Landon) sued obstetrician Dr. Pamela Goodwin and her practice after Landon sustained a severe brachial plexus injury during his 2012 delivery.
- The complaint alleged improper/excessive downward traction during a diagnosed shoulder dystocia caused permanent nerve injury; co-defendant Dr. Loren Hutter and the hospital settled and were dismissed before trial.
- At trial plaintiffs’ experts blamed excessive physician-applied traction for the permanent injury; defense experts and Goodwin disputed that she applied excessive traction and argued Hutter or other forces could be the sole proximate cause.
- The court instructed the jury using IPI Civil No. 12.04 (including the second paragraph on sole proximate cause) and submitted a special interrogatory asking whether the sole proximate cause was the conduct of some person other than Goodwin.
- The jury returned a verdict for Goodwin and Associates and answered the interrogatory that some other person was the sole proximate cause; plaintiffs’ posttrial motion was denied and they appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the long form of IPI Civil No. 12.04 and a special interrogatory on sole proximate cause were proper | No evidence supported isolating a single nonparty as the sole proximate cause; proximate causation was additive (maternal forces + traction) | Some evidence (Goodwin’s testimony, defense experts) permitted an inference that Hutter — not Goodwin — was the sole proximate cause | Affirmed: instruction and interrogatory proper because some evidence tended to show a nonparty could be the sole proximate cause |
| Whether defense could cross-examine plaintiffs’ expert about negligence of the settled co-defendant Hutter | Cross-examining on Hutter’s negligence was improper and prejudicial given his dismissal/settlement | Questions probative of credibility and integral to causation; cross-exam allowed to test expert’s basis and credibility | Affirmed: no abuse of discretion; cross-examination on Hutter’s conduct/negligence was permissible |
| Whether the verdict (and special interrogatory answer) was against the manifest weight of the evidence | Evidence clearly showed Goodwin’s actions were a proximate cause; jury finding to the contrary was unreasonable | Jury could credit defense witnesses and Goodwin; reasonable resolution of competing expert testimony | Affirmed: verdict not against manifest weight; jury could reasonably find Goodwin did not cause the permanent injury |
Key Cases Cited
- Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill.2d 83 (Ill. 1995) (defendant may present evidence that a third party was the sole proximate cause and a jury may be instructed accordingly)
- McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill.2d 505 (Ill. 2000) (defendant need not prove the other person was negligent—only that their conduct was the sole proximate cause)
- Bauer v. Memorial Hospital, 377 Ill. App. 3d 895 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (discussion of scope of cross-examination concerning third-party negligence)