Germain Skinner v. Barry McLemore, 425 F. App'x 491

Skinner was convicted in 2001 in Genesee County, Michigan of CSC-I, CSC-II, and first-degree home invasion after a break-in and sexual assault of an 11-year-old girl; DNA on the victim’s comforter linked Skinner to the crime.
The Michigan courts denied relief on direct appeal, post-conviction relief, and discretionary review, with standard orders citing MCR 6.508(D).
Skinner filed a federal habeas petition in 2006 raising prosecutorial misconduct claims and related issues, which the district court denied on the merits but granted a certificate of appealability for two misconduct claims.
The Sixth Circuit reversed in part to consider whether Skinner procedurally defaulted his claims and then addressed the merits of two prosecutorial misconduct claims: (i) improper arguments about DNA testing, and (ii) comments on Skinner’s failure to testify.
The court held Skinner’s current claims were not procedurally defaulted, proceeded to the merits, and affirmed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition.
Key factual and procedural issue was whether state courts clearly relied on a procedural bar and whether the prosecutor’s comments violated due process.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Procedural default for prosecutorial misconduct claims	Skinner argues state courts applied a procedural bar to default his claims	Respondent contends Skinner exhausted or defaulted via state rules	Not procedurally defaulted; merits reached
Prosecutor’s DNA-argument comments improper	Comments about DNA testing and lack of defense testing violated evidence rules	Comments were within bounds and did not rely on facts not in evidence	Not improper; did not, by itself, deny due process
Prosecutor’s comments on failure to testify
Prosecutor improperly commented on Skinner’s failure to testify	Comments described defense theory and evidence; not a direct comment on silence	Comments within proper argument; did not violate due process

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (U.S. 1989) (exhaustion requires presentation to state courts on the merits)
Simpson v. Jones, 238 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2000) (look-through rule for unexplained state-court orders under 6th Cir.)
Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (U.S. 1989) (unambiguous reliance required for procedural-default bar)
Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (en banc: clarified that brief MCR 6.508(D) orders are not explained judgments)
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (U.S. 1991) (last-explained-state-court-judgment approach for default)
Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2003) (requirement of clear/express reliance on procedural bar)
Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2000) (explanation of procedural-default standards)
Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 926 (6th Cir. 2004) (explanation of state-court exhaustion and MCR 6.508(D) provisions)
Munson v. Kapture, 384 F.3d 310 (6th Cir. 2004) (last- explanation state court judgment standard)
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 60 (U.S. 1991) (federal review not to reexamine state-law evidentiary rulings)