821 F.3d 951
8th Cir.2016Background
- Perez, a lawful permanent resident from Mexico, faced removal based on two October 18, 2011 convictions for "Assault Domestic Abuse, Third or Subsequent Offense" under Iowa Code § 708.2A(4), plus earlier domestic-assault convictions in 2004 and 2007.
- The NTA alleged two separate convictions not arising from a single scheme, triggering removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (two or more CIMTs).
- The IJ applied the Silva‑Trevino three‑step framework, found one conviction ambiguous as to bodily injury, considered police reports, and concluded both § 708.2A(4) convictions were crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs); denial of cancellation of removal followed.
- The BIA affirmed, reasoning that the recidivist third/subsequent‑offense provision adds aggravating elements (intent + repetition + domestic victim) that elevate the offense to a CIMT, relying on its precedents distinguishing simple offenses from aggravated variants.
- The case was remanded after the Attorney General vacated Silva‑Trevino I; on remand the BIA again treated § 708.2A(4) as categorically a CIMT. The Eighth Circuit granted review to decide whether the BIA erred in refusing to apply the modified categorical approach to § 708.1’s divisible subsections.
- The Eighth Circuit held § 708.1 is divisible (some subsections criminalize de minimis/offensive touching while others require intent to injure or place in fear of injurious contact), so the BIA should have applied the modified categorical approach to Perez’s record of conviction; the case was remanded to the BIA for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Perez’s § 708.2A(4) convictions categorically constitute CIMTs | Perez: § 708.2A is a recidivist statute; a single domestic‑assault under § 708.2A is not a CIMT, so multiple convictions do not transform it into CIMTs (Torres‑Varela precedent). | Government/BIA: The recidivist third/subsequent offense adds aggravating elements (intent, repetition, domestic victim) that elevate § 708.2A(4) to a CIMT (analogous to Lopez‑Meza). | Held: § 708.1 is divisible and criminalizes both turpitudinous and non‑turpitudinous conduct; the BIA erred by refusing the modified categorical inquiry and must review Perez’s record of conviction on remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (Sup. Ct.) (categorical-approach focus on minimum conduct criminalized by state statute)
- Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (Sup. Ct.) (conviction presumed to rest on least conduct criminalized; realistic probability test)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (Sup. Ct.) (divisible statutes permit modified categorical approach)
- Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (Sup. Ct.) (use of categorical approach to compare state offenses to generic federal definitions)
- Gomez‑Gutierrez v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 1053 (8th Cir.) (question whether a state conviction is a CIMT is a legal question reviewed de novo)
- Chanmouny v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 810 (8th Cir.) (simple assault typically not a CIMT)
- Cisneros‑Guerrero v. Holder, 774 F.3d 1056 (5th Cir.) (divisibility of statute with turpitudinous and non‑turpitudinous alternatives; use modified categorical approach)
- Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir.) (remand appropriate where BIA failed to apply modified categorical approach when statute is divisible)
