953 F.3d 550
8th Cir.2020Background
- Petitioner Gerardo Campos, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. in 2000 and was placed in removal proceedings in 2014; he conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
- Cancellation requires 10 years continuous presence, good moral character, no disqualifying convictions, and that removal would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to a qualifying relative; Campos’s qualifying relative was his 13‑year‑old daughter, Martha.
- At the 2016 hearing the IJ found Campos met the first three statutory requirements but denied cancellation, concluding Campos failed to prove exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to Martha; the IJ also (erroneously) stated Martha had no mental‑health diagnosis.
- On appeal the BIA agreed the IJ had erred about the diagnosis but held the error was harmless after reviewing the record and affirmed the denial of cancellation.
- Campos separately moved to remand with additional evidence (a post‑decision nurse practitioner letter, prior medical records, and two articles); the BIA denied the motion as not presenting new or previously unavailable evidence.
- The Eighth Circuit denied Campos’s petition for review, holding the BIA did not impermissibly factfind, did not err as a matter of law in its handling of hardship factors, and did not abuse its discretion in denying remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the BIA impermissibly engaged in factfinding by correcting an IJ factual finding and resolving the appeal without remanding | Campos: BIA violated 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(d)(3)(iv) by making factual determinations instead of remanding to the IJ | Government: BIA may determine IJ factual error and assess harmlessness on the existing record without remand | Held: BIA did not improperly factfind; harmless‑error appellate review of the IJ’s record was permissible |
| Whether the BIA committed legal error by failing to address or weigh specific hardship factors | Campos: BIA omitted consideration of certain hardship factors and thus committed reviewable legal error | Government: Weighing of hardship factors is discretionary and not reviewable as law | Held: Court lacks jurisdiction to reweigh discretionary hardship determinations; no reviewable legal error shown |
| Whether the BIA abused its discretion by denying Campos’s motion to remand for new evidence | Campos: New evidence (NP letter, medical records, articles) warranted remand to the IJ | Government: Evidence was not new or previously unavailable and would not likely change the result | Held: No abuse of discretion; evidence was not new or unavailable and remand not warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (U.S. 2010) (limits judicial review of discretionary BIA decisions and discusses reviewability/remand principles)
- Rotinsulu v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2008) (BIA may weigh and evaluate evidence before the IJ; regulation not meant to unduly restrict review powers)
- Nabulwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 2007) (distinguishing cases where further factfinding before the IJ is required)
- Robles v. Barr, 940 F.3d 420 (8th Cir. 2019) (appellate review may identify IJ error and conclude it is harmless after reviewing the record)
- Hernandez-Garcia v. Holder, 765 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2014) (applicants may not manufacture jurisdiction by recasting discretionary abuse‑of‑discretion arguments as legal questions)
- Salas-Caballero v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2015) (weighing hardship factors is discretionary and not subject to judicial reweighing)
- Solis v. Holder, 647 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2011) (discretionary nature of hardship determinations)
- Alva-Arellano v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2016) (remand standard: denial reviewed for abuse of discretion; remand not warranted if evidence was available earlier)
- Berte v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2005) (BIA will remand only if new evidence would likely change the result)
- Lee v. Holder, 765 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2014) (similar principles on new evidence and remand)
