Gerald Winfield v. Stephanie Dorethy
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 17672
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Gerald Winfield was convicted after a bench trial of attempted murder for shooting Jarlon Garrett (another victim, Dominick Stovall, died; Winfield acquitted of that murder). The conviction relied largely on a signed written statement by Winfield and witness identifications; the trial judge found witnesses’ credibility mixed.
- Winfield appealed and pursued state post-conviction relief arguing ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) for failing to raise certain issues; state courts denied relief on alternate grounds (failure to inform counsel or strategic choice).
- Winfield filed a federal habeas petition; the State conceded in district court that the pre-AEDPA (de novo) standard applied and that Illinois courts had not adjudicated the IAC claim on the merits.
- The district court (applying the agreed pre-AEDPA standard) granted habeas relief, holding appellate counsel was deficient, and ordered the State to reopen Winfield’s appeal.
- After judgment, the State sought relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) arguing AEDPA’s deferential §2254(d) standard actually applied; the district court denied the motion as improperly raising a new argument post-judgment and stayed its order pending appeal.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, holding the §2254(d) standard is not waivable by the parties, and remanded for proceedings consistent with AEDPA deference (i.e., apply §2254(d) review).
Issues
| Issue | Winfield's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AEDPA §2254(d) deference can be waived/forfeited by a State’s concession in district court | Winfield: State effectively forfeited/estopped from asserting §2254(d) because it conceded the pre-AEDPA standard below | State: initially conceded de novo review but later argued AEDPA deference should apply; Rule 59(e) could correct the district court | Held: §2254(d) standard is non-waivable; courts must decide correct standard regardless of parties’ concessions — reverse and remand |
| Whether the State could rescind its concession after judgment via Rule 59(e) | Winfield: concession should bind the State; estoppel of factual predicate for AEDPA | State: Rule 59(e) permitted correction of the earlier mistaken concession | Held: District court erred to treat concession as binding regarding §2254(d); the applicability of AEDPA is a question the court must address regardless of concession |
| Whether Winfield established ineffective assistance of appellate counsel under proper (AEDPA) review | Winfield: appellate counsel was deficient for not raising corpus delicti / sufficiency corroboration of confession | State: appellate decision on state-court record merits AEDPA deference; counsel performance was reasonable | Held: Case remanded for application of §2254(d) (doubly deferential Strickland review); Seventh Circuit did not resolve merits of IAC claim on the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (Sup. Ct.) (AEDPA imposes a highly deferential standard; state-court adjudication must be unreasonable to warrant relief)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (Sup. Ct.) (AEDPA limits federal habeas review and reinforces deference to state-court factfinding and merits rulings)
- Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289 (Sup. Ct.) (presumption that a state court adjudicated a federal claim on the merits absent indication otherwise)
- Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463 (Sup. Ct.) (doctrines like exhaustion and timeliness implicate federal-state comity and values beyond the parties)
- Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (Sup. Ct.) (federal courts may, in exceptional cases, consider state procedural defenses the State overlooked)
- Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (Sup. Ct.) (federal courts may raise untimeliness issues sua sponte because limitations implicate broader values)
- Eze v. Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110 (2d Cir.) (§2254(d) is not a procedural defense that the State can waive by failing to invoke it)
- Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862 (10th Cir.) (the correct AEDPA standard of review is non-waivable and must be applied)
- Watkins v. Meloy, 94 F.3d 4 (7th Cir.) (early post-AEDPA case noting waiver in context of the new Act but decided before extensive AEDPA jurisprudence developed)
- Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 974 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir.) (Rule 59 should not be used to raise new arguments that could and should have been raised before judgment)