947 F.3d 510
9th Cir.2019Background
- Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr. was sentenced to death in Idaho (1986) and later filed a successive habeas petition asserting he is intellectually disabled under Atkins v. Virginia and Idaho Code § 19-2515A (adopted after Atkins).
- Idaho statute defines intellectual disability with three elements: IQ of 70 or below, significant adaptive-functioning limitations in ≥2 listed areas, and onset before age 18.
- The Idaho Supreme Court (2008) applied the statute to Pizzuto, relying on a single 1985 verbal IQ score of 72 and concluded he failed to make a prima facie showing of a pre-18 IQ ≤70; it affirmed dismissal without holding an evidentiary hearing or ordering new pre-18 testing.
- Pizzuto sought federal habeas relief; lower federal courts denied relief; this appeal reviews whether the Idaho decision violated AEDPA standards (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
- The Ninth Circuit panel reviewed whether the state-court ruling was (1) contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent and/or (2) based on an unreasonable factual determination, and affirmed the district court because § 2254(d) was not satisfied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Pizzuto) | Defendant's Argument (Blades/State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Idaho Supreme Court unreasonably applied Atkins by enforcing a hard IQ ≤70 cutoff | Idaho: Idaho court ignored clinical standards (DSM/AAMR/AAIDD) that view IQ as a range (±SE) and allow diagnosis for IQs ~70–75 when adaptive deficits exist | State: Atkins left states discretion to define intellectual disability; Idaho statute plainly requires IQ ≤70 and court properly applied it | Court: Not an unreasonable application under §2254(d)(1); clinical-consistency argument was not "beyond fairminded disagreement" in 2008 |
| Whether later Supreme Court decisions (Hall, Brumfield, Moore) render the Idaho decision contrary to clearly established federal law | Idaho’s hard cutoff conflicts with Hall/Brumfield/Moore, which require considering the standard error and adaptive evidence when scores fall within the margin | State: Those cases postdate the Idaho decision; §2254(d)(1) looks to law clearly established at time of state adjudication | Court: Hall/Brumfield/Moore postdate 2008 decision; therefore Idaho decision not contrary to clearly established law at that time |
| Whether the Idaho Supreme Court made unreasonable factual findings (e.g., ignoring school records, concluding IQ could decline) | Pizzuto: Court unreasonably ignored school records and expert-consistent evidence that his IQ was ≤70 pre-18; denial of evidentiary hearing defective | State: Record before state court largely lacked pre-18 IQ evidence; experts’ opinions supported reasonable inferences the court drew; Pizzuto did not pursue requested testing/hearing | Court: Under §2254(d)(2) deferential standard, state-court factual determinations were not objectively unreasonable |
| Whether denial of an evidentiary hearing or expert testing rendered state factfinding unreasonable | Pizzuto: He only needed to raise a reasonable doubt to trigger a hearing; Brumfield supports a hearing where reasonable doubt exists | State: Idaho court addressed prima facie showing and noted Pizzuto failed to pursue testing or show additional testing would produce pre-18 IQ evidence | Held: Idaho court did not make a reasonable-doubt finding and did not unreasonably deny a hearing under AEDPA standards; failure to apply a "reasonable doubt" standard was not contrary to Atkins in 2008 |
Key Cases Cited
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (Eighth Amendment bars execution of intellectually disabled persons; left definition to states while noting clinical definitions)
- Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014) (unconstitutional to foreclose further inquiry based on a strict IQ cutoff; IQ scores represent a range)
- Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015) (IQ scores cannot be assessed in a vacuum; denial of evidentiary hearing was an unreasonable factual determination in that case)
- Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) (intellectual-disability determinations must be informed by medical community standards; where score range reaches ≤70, courts must consider adaptive functioning)
- Shoop v. Hill, 139 S. Ct. 504 (2019) (discussing what constituted clearly established law regarding Atkins in 2008)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (AEDPA limits federal habeas review to the state-court record)