Gerald Pizzuto, Jr. v. Randy Blades
729 F.3d 1211
9th Cir.2013Background
- Pizzuto was convicted of two first-degree murders and sentenced to death; he later sought relief under Atkins v. Virginia (prohibiting execution of mentally retarded persons).
- Idaho enacted a statute defining “mentally retarded” as IQ of 70 or below plus adaptive-functioning deficits with onset before age 18 (Idaho Code § 19-2515A).
- In state post-conviction proceedings Pizzuto presented a 1985 verbal WAIS-R score of 72 (age ~29), expert affidavits describing borderline intellectual functioning, school records, and evidence of long-term seizures and substance abuse. He argued SEM and the Flynn Effect would lower his score below 70.
- The state trial court granted summary judgment for the State (finding no genuine issue of material fact and the petition untimely in part); the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Pizzuto failed to show an IQ ≤70 before age 18 and rejecting adjustments such as the Flynn Effect/SEM without supporting expert proof.
- Federal habeas review under AEDPA: district court denied relief; Ninth Circuit reviews whether the Idaho Supreme Court unreasonably applied Atkins (§2254(d)(1)) or made unreasonable factual findings (§2254(d)(2)).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Pizzuto) | Defendant's Argument (State/Idaho Supreme Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Idaho’s statutory definition and its application violated Atkins | Idaho’s application was too rigid (70 cutoff) and failed to account for SEM and Flynn Effect, risking exclusion of persons Atkins protects | Idaho statute conforms to clinical definitions cited in Atkins; states may set definitions and procedures; no single mandated IQ-adjustment method | Idaho’s application was not an unreasonable application of Atkins under §2254(d)(1); affirmed |
| Whether the Idaho Supreme Court unreasonably applied Atkins by not requiring SEM/Flynn adjustments | Atkins and precedent require such adjustments to determine true IQ | Atkins does not mandate SEM or Flynn adjustments; courts/states have discretion; no clearly established federal law requiring those adjustments | Court held Idaho’s refusal to apply Flynn/SEM was not an objectively unreasonable application of Atkins |
| Whether the state court’s factual findings (IQ before age 18) were unreasonable under §2254(d)(2) | Record and expert opinions support downward-adjusted IQ and retardation onset before 18; factual findings lacked substantiation | Record contained only one adult IQ score (72) and evidence of seizure/substance-related decline; no expert saying IQ was ≤70 before 18 | Ninth Circuit: Idaho Supreme Court’s factual determinations were not unreasonable given the limited record; §2254(d)(2) burden not met |
| Whether denial of an evidentiary hearing violated due process or was unreasonable | Denial deprived Pizzuto of chance to develop evidence (SEM/Flynn effects, expert proof) and procedures like Ford/Panetti should apply | Pizzuto effectively moved for summary judgment (stipulating record sufficient); Idaho law allows prima facie threshold on collateral review; Ford/Panetti procedures not required for Atkins | Denial was not unreasonable: state court permissibly resolved cross-motions on the record and gatekeeping rules for post-conviction claims are constitutional |
Key Cases Cited
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (Eighth Amendment forbids execution of mentally retarded persons)
- Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (procedural protections for incompetency claims discussed; states retain role in defining standards)
- Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007) (AEDPA deference to state-court factual findings)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (federal habeas review under §2254(d) limited to state-court record)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (§2254(d)(1) asks whether state-court application of Supreme Court precedent was unreasonable)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (standards for unreasonable application of federal law under AEDPA)
- Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (procedural threshold and protections for competency-to-be-executed claims)
- Moormann v. Schriro, 672 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2012) (Atkins leaves states leeway to define mental retardation)