Gerald Christopher Zuliani v. State
03-13-00495-CR
| Tex. App. | Jun 15, 2015Background
- Appellant Gerald Christopher Zuliani appealed convictions in multiple Travis County causes, including an assault-strangulation count charged under Tex. Penal Code §22.01(b-1) that alleged a prior conviction elevating the offense.
- At trial appellant stipulated to a prior conviction in one indictment (D‑1‑DC‑13‑900010) but the stipulation was expressly limited to that indictment and was not stipulated in the strangulation indictment (D‑1‑DC‑13‑900011).
- The jury charge for the strangulation count did not include the §22.01(b-1) prior‑conviction element in its abstract or application paragraphs, and the charge expressly told the jury that the stipulation in the other cause could be considered only for that other indictment.
- Appellant argued on appeal (and in this motion for rehearing) that the State failed to prove the prior required for §22.01(b-1), that the omission in the charge violated Alleyne and due process, and that the conviction should be reduced or acquitted for failure of proof.
- Additional appellate issues: alleged insufficiency of evidence and problematic timing theories for aggravated kidnapping; refusal of the trial court to order election between multiple alleged assaults and kidnappings across several days; alleged conflict between the Steele ‘‘single transaction’’ doctrine and jury‑unanimity/double‑jeopardy principles.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Zuliani) | Held (Appellate Court action criticized in motion) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of proof of prior conviction for §22.01(b-1) elevation | The conviction stands (court treated appellant’s related point as jury‑charge error only). | No stipulation or evidence of the prior exists in the strangulation cause; State failed to prove element beyond a reasonable doubt. | Appellate court treated Point 14 as charge error and did not grant relief on failure‑of‑proof ground (motion argues this was error). |
| Jury charge omission / Alleyne (must submit sentence‑affecting facts to jury) | Charge error was harmless; appellant had stipulated to priors in related proceedings. | Omission of the prior element deprived jury of required finding under Alleyne; Sixth Amendment/due process violation. | Appellate court rejected relief on charge/Almanza review; motion argues the omission caused constitutional harm and requires reversal. |
| Sufficiency / timing of aggravated kidnapping (when restraint occurred) | Court construed kidnapping to have occurred in a continuous episode tied to deadly‑weapon use. | Multiple discrete theories (different days/times) were argued at trial; appellate court’s new timing theory was not litigated and creates double‑jeopardy/unanimity problems. | Appellate court upheld conviction by adopting a theory (use of deadly weapon Sunday) the motion says was not the State’s trial theory; motion argues this was improper. |
| Refusal to order State election between multiple assaults/kidnappings | Election not required because acts were part of one criminal transaction (Steele exception). | Acts produced separate result‑oriented offenses over different times/places; Steele exception inapplicable; election required to ensure unanimity and prevent multiple prosecutions of discrete acts. | Appellate court affirmed denial of election relying on Steele; motion contends that reliance is inconsistent with more recent CCA authority and jury‑unanimity/allowable‑unit rules. |
Key Cases Cited
- Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (U.S. 2013) (facts that raise mandatory minimums must be found by the jury)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (U.S. 1970) (prosecution must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Bryant v. State, 187 S.W.3d 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (state’s burden to prove enhancement elements absent a valid stipulation)
- Martin v. State, 200 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (harm analysis for charge error when stipulations/prior convictions implicated)
- Phillips v. State, 193 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (limits Steele to continuous acts that are part and parcel of the same criminal transaction)
- Garfias v. State, 424 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (unit‑of‑prosecution and when multiple convictions may arise from a transaction)
- Love v. State, 401 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (separate acts can yield separate convictions despite a unifying intent)
