Geovany Diaz v. State of Indiana, 158 N.E.3d 363

On November 30, 2018, Geovany Diaz entered a car to buy Xanax pills, shot Jesse Harris multiple times (killing him) and shot Dejon Wooden (who survived), then took both victims’ phones/wallets and the pills.
Diaz was charged with murder, felony murder, multiple robbery counts (various levels and enhancements), and battery; a jury convicted him on all counts.
The trial court, mindful of double-jeopardy concerns, entered three convictions: murder (Harris), Level 5 robbery (Harris), and Level 2 robbery (Wooden).
Sentencing: four aggravators (criminal history, committing offenses while on community corrections, nature/circumstances of the offense, high IRAS risk) and two mitigators (substance abuse, family hardship); court imposed 58 years (murder), 5 years (robbery of Harris, concurrent), and 20 years (robbery of Wooden, consecutive) for a total of 78 years.
On appeal Diaz argued (1) double jeopardy as to the murder and Level 5 robbery of Harris (invoking the Richardson actual‑evidence test and continuous‑crime/“one act” theories), and (2) sentencing errors (age as a mitigator and overall inappropriateness).
After briefing, the Indiana Supreme Court decided Wadle and Powell, which adopted a new statutory/inclusion‑based framework for substantive double‑jeopardy claims; the court applied both the pre‑Wadle and Wadle analyses here.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether convictions for murder and Level 5 robbery of the same victim violate double jeopardy	State: Murder and robbery are distinct offenses with unique elements; convictions may stand.	Diaz: Convictions violate double jeopardy under Richardson actual‑evidence test and continuous‑crime/"one action" doctrine because offenses arose in a single brief transaction.	No double jeopardy. Under pre‑Wadle actual‑evidence each offense required at least one unique evidentiary fact; under Wadle neither offense is an included offense of the other, so convictions may both stand.
Whether Diaz’s age (21 at offense) should be treated as a mitigating factor	State: Trial court did not abuse discretion in declining age as mitigator given Diaz’s recent felony history and probation/community‑corrections violations.	Diaz: Young age implies greater rehabilitative potential; should be mitigating.	No abuse of discretion; court reasonably declined to find age mitigating based on prior convictions and violations.
Whether the aggregate 78‑year sentence is inappropriate	State: Aggravators (criminal history, offenses while on supervision, multiple victims) justify consecutive and above‑advisory terms.	Diaz: Offense was an unplanned robbery gone wrong; death not intended — sentence excessive.	Sentence affirmed. Trial court’s weighing of aggravators and consecutive terms was reasonable; Diaz failed to meet the burden under App. R. 7(B).

Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020) (announcing the new statutory/inclusion‑based framework for substantive double‑jeopardy claims when multiple statutes are implicated)
Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020) (companion decision addressing multiple‑injury claims under a related framework)
Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999) (established the pre‑Wadle actual‑evidence test for substantive double‑jeopardy challenges)
Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216 (Ind. 2015) (explaining the continuous‑crime doctrine and limits on its application)
Bald v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 2002) (actual‑evidence test: convictions permissible when each requires at least one unique evidentiary fact)
Carrico v. State, 775 N.E.2d 312 (Ind. 2002) (illustrating that murder and robbery convictions can co‑exist when distinct elements are proven)
Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069 (Ind. 2015) (multiple victims can support consecutive sentences)