Georgina Afari-Opoku v. Camelot Club Condominium Association, Inc.
340 Ga. App. 618
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Resident Emmanuel Afari-Opoku was followed home and murdered after assailants were allowed through the gated entry at Camelot Club; the security guard on duty had let their vehicle into the complex.
- Plaintiff Georgina (surviving spouse/personal representative) sued Camelot Club Condominium Association and Alliance Security & Protective Services for negligence (premises liability and common-law negligence) and nuisance, alleging inadequate security.
- At trial the jury awarded $3,250,000 and apportioned fault: 25% Camelot, 25% Alliance, and 50% to three nonparties (Assailants). Camelot moved for directed verdicts and later challenged post-trial entry of judgment imputed with Alliance’s share.
- The trial court entered judgment against Camelot for $1,625,000 (combining Camelot’s 25% and Alliance’s 25%) and against Alliance for $812,500. Camelot appealed; Georgina cross-appealed limited evidentiary/apportionment rulings.
- The Court of Appeals upheld denial of Camelot’s directed verdicts on foreseeability, superior knowledge, and nuisance (finding sufficient prior criminal incidents and evidence of Camelot’s awareness), but vacated the portion of the judgment that charged Camelot with Alliance’s share and remanded for entry consistent with the jury verdict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Camelot breached duties under OCGA § 51-3-1 (premises liability) | Prior criminal activity on/near property made the murder reasonably foreseeable and Camelot had superior knowledge; plaintiff relied on prior incidents and Camelot’s own CEO testimony | Camelot argued no foreseeability or superior knowledge and thus no breach; also argued crime originated elsewhere | Denied directed verdict: jury could find prior crimes were substantially similar and that Camelot had superior knowledge; foreseeability and superior knowledge were jury questions |
| Whether third-party crime can support nuisance claim against Camelot | Repeated criminal incidents on the property created/maintained a nuisance regardless of later hiring of security | Camelot argued hiring Alliance negated nuisance and that third-party crime alone is insufficient to establish nuisance | Denied directed verdict: evidence of repeated crimes created a jury question whether Camelot maintained a nuisance; owner action does not foreclose nuisance finding |
| Whether jury could apportion fault between Camelot and Alliance (and whether plaintiff waived objection) | Georgina argued Camelot can be vicariously liable for Alliance under OCGA § 51-2-5(4) & (5); she defended apportionment to Alliance | Camelot consented to jury apportionment but contended it should not be charged with Alliance’s share because liability as to Alliance was independent or control insufficient for vicarious liability | Court found Georgina acquiesced to verdict form (so her trial objection waived); but because the general verdict left unclear which theory the jury used, the trial court erred in imputing Alliance’s share to Camelot; vacated that portion of judgment |
| Whether apportionment statute OCGA § 51-12-33(b) bars reassigning Alliance’s apportioned liability to Camelot when vicarious liability is at issue | Georgina relied on PN Express to argue apportionment does not apply to pure vicarious liability and thus damages should be reassigned | Camelot relied on apportionment statute and jury verdict to avoid being charged with Alliance’s separate share | Court held jury could have based liability on multiple independent theories (nuisance, Camelot negligence, Alliance negligence, or non-delegable statutory duty). Because verdict was general, court could not tell if Alliance’s liability was independent; thus trial court erred in assigning Alliance’s share to Camelot and must enter judgment consistent with jury apportionment |
Key Cases Cited
- Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785 (Ga. 1997) (prior criminal acts need not be identical but must attract owner’s attention to dangerous condition; foreseeability is generally a jury question)
- PN Express, Inc. v. Zegel, 304 Ga. App. 672 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (where employer’s liability is solely vicarious with no independent acts alleged, exoneration of employee exonerates employer)
- Bethany Group, LLC v. Grobman, 315 Ga. App. 298 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (repeated crimes on property can create question whether owner created/maintained nuisance)
- McNeal v. Days Inn of America, Inc., 230 Ga. App. 786 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (foreseeability of criminal act on premises may exist even if criminal conduct began elsewhere)
- Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (Ga. 1997) (premises liability requires owner’s actual or constructive knowledge and invitee’s lack of knowledge despite ordinary care)
- Millard v. AAA Electrical Contractors &c., 119 Ga. App. 548 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969) (statutory/non-delegable duties can make an employer liable for contractor’s negligence)
- Crawford v. Johnson, 227 Ga. App. 548 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (general verdict may prevent determination of which claim the jury relied on for liability)