Georgie Brewer v. New Era, Inc., 564 F. App'x 834

Georgie Brewer (77) and Barbara Greene (70), African-American sisters, were longtime packing-line employees at New Era, Inc., hired in 1983 and laid off during a 2008 workforce reduction.
New Era adopted a subjective three-pronged retention standard during the RIF: cross-training, working well with others, and consistent production; Martelli (plant manager) with supervisors Price and Northington selected layoffs and informed corporate officers.
Plaintiffs allege preexisting discriminatory treatment: prior 1994 EEOC complaints about pay, supervisor Price’s repeated racial slurs and favoritism toward Korean employees, and comments by owner’s son Jeffrey Henn reportedly saying the sisters were “too old” and “needed to retire.”
Eight employees were laid off (mixed races and ages); two Korean employees remained (one recalled in Jan. 2009). Plaintiffs contend New Era failed to follow an asserted seniority practice.
District court granted summary judgment for New Era, finding only economic necessity; Sixth Circuit reversed, holding triable issues exist on both age (ADEA and Title VII) and race (Title VII) discrimination claims and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Age discrimination under ADEA/Title VII	Jeffrey Henn’s statements that the sisters were “too old” and “needed to retire” and failure to apply a seniority practice show age was a motivating factor	Layoffs were driven by legitimate economic RIF using neutral three-pronged criteria	Reversed: statements and evidence create triable issues; summary judgment improper on age claims
Race discrimination under Title VII	Supervisor Price’s racial animus, preferential treatment of Korean employees, and decisionmakers’ reliance on subjective criteria show race motivated layoffs	Termination resulted from legitimate RIF and subjective evaluations (teamwork, cross-training, production)	Reversed: circumstantial evidence and credibility disputes create genuine issues of fact; summary judgment improper on race claims

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (plaintiff retains ultimate burden; prima facie plus proof of pretext can support liability)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination claims)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (summary judgment standards and burden on movant)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (genuine issue for trial when reasonable jury could return verdict for nonmoving party)
DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 2004) (direct evidence can shift burden to employer)
Wexler v. White's Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2003) (definition of direct evidence in discrimination cases)
Blair v. Henry Filters, Inc., 505 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2007) (addressing when comments constitute direct or circumstantial evidence)
Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241 (6th Cir. 1995) (managerial racist comments as direct evidence of discriminatory motivation)
Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., Numerical Control, Inc., 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982) (subjective employment criteria can provide a mechanism for discrimination)