590 U.S. 255
SCOTUS2020Background
- Georgia’s Official Code of Georgia Annotated (OCGA) contains enacted statutory text plus nonbinding annotations (case summaries, attorney general opinions, research citations) assembled under the Code Revision Commission and published by Matthew Bender (Lexis) under a work-for-hire contract that vests copyright in the State.
- The Commission is created and funded by the Georgia Legislature, staffed by the Office of Legislative Counsel, and its proposed statutory text and annotations are approved and merged by the Legislature before official publication.
- Public.Resource.Org (PRO) posted and distributed digital copies of the OCGA annotations without permission; the Commission sued for copyright infringement and obtained a preliminary victory in district court.
- The Eleventh Circuit reversed, applying the government edicts doctrine to hold the annotations uncopyrightable; the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit: under the government edicts doctrine judges and legislators cannot be authors for copyright purposes of works they create in their official capacities, so the Commission’s annotations are ineligible for copyright.
Issues
| Issue | Commission / Georgia (Plaintiff) Argument | PRO (Defendant) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are the OCGA annotations copyrightable? | Annotations are original, editorial material not enacted into law and thus protectable as "annotations" under §101. | Annotations are authored by a legislative body acting in its official capacity and thus fall under the government edicts doctrine and are uncopyrightable. | Held: Not copyrightable; government edicts doctrine bars copyright when created by officials empowered to speak with the force of law (here, a legislative arm). |
| Is the Code Revision Commission the "author" and an arm of the legislature? | The Commission is a separate entity and contract principal; Lexis does the drafting, so State copyright is valid under work-for-hire. | The Commission is functionally an arm/adjunct of the Georgia Legislature (legislator-majority membership, funding, staff, legislative approval), so it counts as the legislative author. | Held: The Commission qualifies as an arm of the legislature and, as statutory "author" under §201(b), its official acts are legislative in nature. |
| Does the Copyright Act text (§101, §105) foreclose the government edicts doctrine for states? | §101 explicitly lists "annotations" and §§101/105 exclude only federal official works; Congress intended states to be able to claim copyright. | The Act’s author-based framework and long-standing precedent interpreting "author" support retaining the government edicts doctrine for state lawmakers; federal-only exceptions do not displace that doctrine. | Held: Text does not displace the doctrine; §101’s listing of "annotations" presumes an "author," and the federal exceptions do not negate the judicially established authorship limitation for officials who make law. |
| Should the doctrine turn on whether a work has the "force of law"? | Georgia urged the Court to focus on whether the annotations carry legal force (they do not), so they should be copyrightable. | The doctrine turns on the identity/official capacity of the author (judges/legislators), not on whether the particular work is binding. | Held: Doctrine rests on authorship/official capacity, not on whether the material has the force of law; even nonbinding materials prepared by lawmakers are excluded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834) (no copyright in this Court’s written opinions; reporters cannot claim such copyright)
- Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888) (judges cannot be authors of works produced in their judicial capacity)
- Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888) (reporter’s original explanatory materials are copyrightable; judicial opinions are not)
- Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (originality requirement for copyright protection)
- Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (scope and policy of copyright are for Congress to define)
- Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U.S. 446 (2015) (respect for precedent and Congress’s role in altering statutory frameworks)