Georgia State Conference of the NAACP v. Fayette County Board of Commissioners, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 204

Background

Fayette County, GA (pop. ~106,567; 19.5% African‑American VAP) used at‑large elections for two five‑member boards (Board of Commissioners (BOC) and Board of Education (BOE)); candidates residence was by district but election was countywide.
No African‑American had ever been elected to either board; voting was racially polarized and African‑American voters favored African‑American candidates.
Plaintiffs (GA NAACP state and county branches and 10 Black registered voters) sued under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, alleging the at‑large system diluted Black voting strength and sought a districting plan with a majority‑minority district.
The BOE initially conceded liability in settlement talks and proposed a consent decree; the district court rejected the BOE plan and later entered summary judgment for plaintiffs against both the BOC and the BOE (though plaintiffs had not moved against the BOE).
The district court adopted a court‑drawn remedial plan and ordered immediate implementation; the BOC and BOE appealed the grant of summary judgment and the remedy.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded limitedly, holding the district court procedurally erred by (1) entering summary judgment against the nonmoving BOE without Rule 56 notice and (2) resolving disputed factual and credibility matters on summary judgment as to the BOC instead of holding a trial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) May a district court sua sponte grant summary judgment against a nonmoving party (the BOE) without notice?	BOE’s concession of liability for settlement sufficed; summary judgment proper.	Rule 56(f) requires notice and opportunity to respond; BOE got no notice and was deprived of chance to oppose.	Reversed: entry of summary judgment against BOE was improper for lack of required notice.
2) Was summary judgment appropriate on §2 liability against the BOC given the record?	The record was developed via discovery and expert reports; cross‑motions and evidence justified summary judgment for plaintiffs.	Disputed material facts remain (numerosity/compactness, totality factors); court impermissibly weighed evidence and made credibility calls.	Reversed in part: summary judgment improper because the court weighed evidence and made credibility determinations; trial/bench findings required.
3) Did plaintiffs satisfy Gingles preconditions (esp. numerosity/compactness) and totality?	Plaintiffs’ experts and undisputed factors (no Black officeholders; polarized voting) establish Gingles and discriminatory result.	Defendants’ expert disputed first Gingles factor and urged different inferences; factual disputes persist.	Court declined to decide merits on appeal; remanded for trial so district court can resolve Gingles and totality with live testimony.
4) Should the court‑drawn remedial plan remain in place pending appeal?	Immediate remedy necessary to prevent disenfranchisement; elections imminent.	Remedy improper if liability determination procedural flawed.	Appellate court declined to reach merits of remedy but left results of election under the plan undisturbed pending remand.

Key Cases Cited

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (establishes three §2 preconditions and directs totality‑of‑circumstances analysis)
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (clarifies scope of Gingles preconditions)
Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993) (discusses §2’s purpose and that discriminatory intent is not required)
McIntosh Cnty. Branch of the NAACP v. City of Darien, 605 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1979) (bench‑trial findings important in vote‑dilution cases)
Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 908 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1990) (summary judgment review and correcting legal errors)
United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428 (11th Cir. 1991) (summary judgment standards - movant must show absence of evidence for nonmoving party)