194 F. Supp. 3d 1322
N.D. Ga.2016Background
- Plaintiffs (Georgia State AFL-CIO and affiliated unions) challenge three provisions of Georgia’s 2013 right-to-work law: O.C.G.A. §§ 34-6-21(d), 34-6-25(a), and 34-6-26(a). These provisions, respectively, bar state enforcement that would "subvert" federally governed representation processes, require payroll deduction authorizations to be revocable at will, and prohibit contracts for non-revocable deductions.
- Plaintiffs allege the Georgia provisions are preempted by the NLRA (29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169) and that § 186(c)(4) creates a federal exception allowing employer checkoff deductions based on written employee authorizations that may be irrevocable for up to one year.
- Many unions here are parties to CBAs that include one-year (or until-expiration) irrevocable dues-checkoff authorizations that would conflict with the Georgia requirement of revocability at will.
- Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings arguing plaintiffs’ preemption claims and § 1983 basis are insufficiently pleaded and that the Supremacy Clause does not itself create a § 1983 right; plaintiffs moved for summary judgment asserting facial preemption under Garmon/Machinists and conflict with § 186(c)(4).
- The district court denied defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion, found plaintiffs adequately pleaded federal preemption and a § 1983 cognizable federal right under NLRA precedents, and granted plaintiffs’ summary judgment: declaring §§ 34-6-21(d), 34-6-25, and 34-6-26 preempted and unenforceable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Georgia §§ 34-6-21(d), -25, -26 are preempted by the NLRA | State law conflicts with NLRA; § 186(c)(4) permits up-to-one-year irrevocable checkoff authorizations and federal law occupies the field for these matters | Georgia law regulates a broader range ("any fee or assessment") and not all employees/employers fall under the NLRA, so not every application conflicts | Court: Statutes preempted — state revocability requirement conflicts with federal exception and NLRB authority; grant summary judgment to plaintiffs |
| Whether plaintiffs pleaded a viable preemption claim | Complaint alleges roles, CBAs, statutory text, and reliance on § 186(c)(4); plausibly states federal preemption | Pleadings insufficient after narrowing claims; prior Garmon-based allegations removed | Court: Pleadings meet Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard; denial of Rule 12(c) motion |
| Whether plaintiffs can pursue § 1983 to enforce NLRA-based rights | NLRA creates rights against state interference in collective bargaining; Golden State Transit and Livadas permit § 1983 suits vindicating NLRA rights | Defendants: Supremacy Clause is not a source of § 1983 rights (citing Armstrong); NLRA doesn't unambiguously confer enforceable individual rights here | Court: NLRA confers sufficiently specific rights to proceed under § 1983; Armstrong inapposite because plaintiffs rely on NLRA rights, not the Supremacy Clause alone |
| Whether Garmon/Machinists preemption principles bar state enforcement here | Checkoff authorizations and related conduct fall within § 7/§ 8 ambit so federal exclusive competence applies (Garmon); and Congress intended bargaining freedom over these terms (Machinists) | Defendants contest reach/applicability of Garmon/Machinists to these state provisions | Court: Garmon and related precedent support preemption; the state law would interfere with NLRB authority and federal scheme |
Key Cases Cited
- Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (recognizing NLRA creates rights protected against state interference)
- Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (permitting § 1983 actions to vindicate NLRA rights against state interference)
- San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (field preemption: defer to NLRB where activity arguably protected or prohibited by NLRA)
- Local 514, Transp. Workers Union v. Keating, 358 F.3d 743 (striking state regulation of checkoff authorizations as preempted)
- NLRB v. Atlanta Printing Specialties & Paper Prods. Union 527, AFL-CIO, 523 F.2d 783 (treating dues-checkoff as a voluntary area for employees and relating to NLRA unfair labor practice regulation)
- SeaPAK v. Indus., Tech. & Prof. Employees, Div. of Nat’l Maritime Union, AFL-CIO, 300 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Ga. 1969) (holding similar Georgia revocability statute incompatible with federal law)