Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Hulsey Environmental Services, Inc., 293 Ga. 504

The Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool (GIIP) is a legislative creation to pay covered claims of insolvent insurers for the benefit of the insureds; it is supervised by the Insurance Commissioner and funded by member insurer assessments.
Southeastern United States Insurance Company (SEUS) converted from a captive to a standard insurer on June 23, 2006, making claims on or after that date covered by GIIP; pre-conversion claims were not covered.
SEUS was liquidated on October 27, 2009, leaving insureds with pre-2006 claims exposed.
In 2010 the legislature amended OCGA § 33-36-20 to retroactively expand GIIP’s "covered claims" to include certain claims from insureds whose policies were issued by captives that later became insolvent, thereby covering some pre-2006 SEUS claims.
GIIP sued two SEUS insureds seeking a declaratory judgment that the 2010 amendment is unconstitutional, arguing the retroactive coverage would reduce GIIP reserves and increase member assessments; the insureds moved to dismiss for lack of standing.
The trial court dismissed and the Court of Appeals affirmed; the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether GIIP has standing to bring the constitutional challenge.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether GIIP, a public entity created by the legislature, has standing to bring a constitutional challenge to the 2010 statutory amendment	GIIP argued it would suffer concrete financial injury (reduced reserves, higher assessments) and thus has standing to challenge the amendment	Defendants argued GIIP is a legislative creation and generally lacks standing to challenge the will of its creator	Held: GIIP lacks standing; as a legislatively created public entity it cannot challenge its enabling statute absent explicit legislative authorization to sue on such matters
Whether the grant to GIIP of the general power to "sue and be sued" confers authority to challenge its enabling legislation	GIIP relied on OCGA § 33-36-6(a) (sue and be sued) as authorization to bring the constitutional challenge	Defendants argued that the sue-and-be-sued clause is limited to GIIP’s statutory functions and does not authorize suits against the legislature or challenges to the statute itself	Held: The sue-and-be-sued clause is limited; it does not grant authority to challenge the legislature’s enactments or question statutory wisdom

City of Atlanta v. Spence, 242 Ga. 194 (1978) (municipal corporations created by the legislature generally lack standing to oppose legislative acts)
V.C. Ellington Co. v. City of Macon, 177 Ga. 541 (1933) (entity created by legislature cannot oppose its creator’s will)
Caldwell v. Hospital Auth. of Charlton County, 248 Ga. 887 (1981) (exception where legislature expressly grants public entity powers like private corporations)
Jekyll Island-State Park Auth. v. Jekyll Island Citizens Assn., 266 Ga. 152 (1996) (discussing scope of powers conferred on public entities)
Harrison v. Thurmond, 252 Ga. App. 402 (2001) (application of the exception to standing limitations)
Reimbursement Consultants v. Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool, 207 Ga. App. 230 (1993) (explaining GIIP’s remedial purpose to provide recovery for covered policyholder claims)