Georgia Department of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc.
294 Ga. 593
| Ga. | 2014Background
- The Center for a Sustainable Coast sued the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and DNR officials seeking to enjoin the issuance of Letters of Permission (LOPs) that allegedly authorized land alterations within the Shore Protection Act’s jurisdiction without the Act’s required permits.
- The trial court dismissed the Center’s declaratory and injunctive claims, finding no waiver of sovereign immunity and no justiciable controversy; the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the declaratory claim but reversed as to injunctive relief, relying on IBM v. Evans to allow an ultra vires injunctive claim.
- After the appeal began, the legislature amended the Act (effective July 1, 2013) to expressly allow DNR to issue LOPs in certain circumstances; the Supreme Court held the case not moot because alleged unlawful LOPs might still fall outside the new statutory authorization.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether sovereign immunity bars injunctive relief at common law and whether IBM v. Evans remained controlling.
- The Court overruled IBM v. Evans, held that only the General Assembly may waive sovereign immunity, and concluded sovereign immunity bars injunctive relief against the State both at common law and under OCGA § 12-5-245.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether sovereign immunity bars common-law injunctive relief against the State | The State’s issuance of LOPs is ultra vires; sovereign immunity does not bar injunctive relief to restrain illegal state action (relying on IBM v. Evans) | Sovereign immunity protects the State and its agencies from suits for injunctive relief absent a legislative waiver | Sovereign immunity bars injunctive relief at common law; IBM v. Evans overruled |
| Whether OCGA § 12-5-245 waives sovereign immunity to permit injunctions against the State | The statute’s language permitting any person to seek injunctions for violations allows suits against the State | The statute contains no specific legislative waiver of sovereign immunity; it targets ‘‘activity’’ by persons, not state permitting action | No waiver found in § 12-5-245; injunctive relief against the State is barred |
| Mootness given 2013 amendment authorizing some LOPs | Center: amendment does not render all complained-of LOPs lawful; injunctive relief remains potentially available | State: amendment might moot or substantially reduce controversy | Court: case not moot because claims may still be viable against LOPs outside the statute’s defined scope |
| Whether Court of Appeals properly relied on IBM v. Evans | Center: IBM permits injunctive suits to restrain ultra vires official acts | State: IBM is inconsistent with constitutional allocation of waiver power to legislature | Court: IBM wrongly created judicial exception and is overruled |
Key Cases Cited
- IBM v. Evans, 265 Ga. 215 (1995) (recognized a judicial "exception" permitting injunctive suits against officials for ultra vires acts; overruled here)
- Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744 (1994) (discussed constitutionalization of sovereign immunity)
- Sheley v. Bd. of Public Ed. for City of Savannah, 233 Ga. 487 (1975) (held courts cannot abrogate sovereign immunity after its constitutional adoption)
- City of Thomasville v. Shank, 263 Ga. 624 (1993) (recognized liability for nuisance/takings-related claims tied to constitutional takings principles)
- Blum v. Schrader, 281 Ga. 238 (2006) (apply plain-meaning construction to constitutional provisions)
- Jackson v. Bibb County School Dist., 271 Ga. 18 (1999) (mootness principle: injunctions become moot when the thing sought to be enjoined has already occurred)