824 S.E.2d 471
S.C. Ct. App.2019Background
- Georgetown County sued the City of Georgetown, SCDOT, and contractors alleging their joint drainage project altered the water table, caused sinkholes, and damaged county-owned public buildings and real property.
- Among multiple claims, the County asserted an inverse condemnation claim against the City and SCDOT seeking just compensation under the Takings Clause, S.C. Const. art. I, § 13.
- The City and SCDOT moved to dismiss the inverse condemnation claim under Rule 12(b)(6); the circuit court granted dismissal and the County appealed.
- The core legal question: whether “private property” in South Carolina’s Takings Clause includes property owned by political subdivisions (counties) and whether a county may sue a state agency (SCDOT) for inverse condemnation.
- The County alternatively argued it was entitled to compensation under the Eminent Domain Procedure Act and that Home Rule or public-policy considerations required recognizing inverse condemnation protection for public property.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “private property” in SC Takings Clause includes property owned by counties/public entities | County: “private property” means any property not owned by the condemnor (i.e., not the State); county property is entitled to constitutional just compensation | City/SCDOT: “private” means non-public; public entities excluded | Held: “Private property” means property owned by private persons/organizations, not public entities or political subdivisions; counties excluded |
| Whether County may maintain inverse condemnation claim against SCDOT (state agency) | County: Home Rule and ownership in county name severed dependency on State; county can be a condemnee against State | Defendants: County is a state-created political subdivision without separate sovereignty; may not sue the State/its arm for inverse condemnation | Held: County may not bring inverse condemnation claim against SCDOT (an arm of the State) |
| Whether the Eminent Domain Procedure Act entitles the County to compensation or alters who is a condemnee | County: Act’s definitions include public entities as "persons" and thus condemnees; the Act governs eminent domain exercises and requires compensation | Defendants: Statutory definitions cannot override constitutional meaning of "private property"; Act doesn’t alter substantive takings law | Held: The Act does not change constitutional scope of "private property"; it cannot convert public property into constitutionally protected private property |
| Whether public policy or Home Rule requires extending Takings Clause to public property | County: Fiscal burden-sharing and Home Rule (county ownership powers; liberal construction for local gov’t) justify protection | Defendants: Policy preferences cannot override plain constitutional language or the relationship of political subdivisions to the State | Held: Public policy and Home Rule do not alter constitutional meaning; courts must apply the law as written |
Key Cases Cited
- Edgefield Cty. v. Ga.-Carolina Power Co., 104 S.C. 311 (1916) (explains public property not within state Takings Clause protection; county could sue only because statute did not grant flooding right)
- United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984) (Fifth Amendment construed to include state/local property when condemned by federal government)
- United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946) (just compensation obligation does not arise when a sovereign transfers public property from one governmental use to another)
- Riley v. S.C. State Highway Dep’t, 238 S.C. 19 (1961) (SCDOT is an arm of the State)
- Godwin v. Carrigan, 227 S.C. 216 (1955) (statutory condemnation machinery applies only where statutes embrace the situation; Act cannot redefine constitutional takings scope)
- Hardin v. S.C. Dep’t of Transp., 371 S.C. 598 (2007) (acknowledges reliance on federal takings law in SC takings jurisprudence)
- Vick v. S.C. Dep’t of Transp., 347 S.C. 470 (2001) (statutory remedies do not displace constitutional inverse condemnation principles)
- Cobb v. S.C. Dep’t of Transp., 365 S.C. 360 (2005) (statutory right to jury trial on compensation applies in inverse condemnation actions)