Georgelas v. Desert Hill Ventures, 45 F.4th 1193

Roger Bliss ran a Ponzi scheme (raised ≈ $27.3M); the district court appointed Tammy Georgelas as Receiver after an SEC enforcement action and final judgment against Bliss.
David Hill worked for the Bliss Enterprise (2011–2015) providing administrative services via Desert Hill Ventures; he was paid $347,000 in wages ($317,000 to Desert Hill; $30,000 directly).
In 2014 Bliss paid contractors $113,878 to renovate Hill’s home for wheelchair accessibility after Hill’s wife was diagnosed with ALS.
The Receiver sued Hill and Desert Hill under Utah’s UFTA to avoid those transfers as fraudulent and recover the amounts for the estates.
The district court granted summary judgment for the Receiver, awarding a total of $460,878; Hill and Desert Hill appealed.
On appeal the parties did not contest that Bliss operated a Ponzi scheme (triggering the UFTA presumption); the dispute concerned (1) whether the wages were paid for "reasonably equivalent value" under UFTA §25-6-9(1), and (2) whether the renovation payments were made for the benefit of Hill under §25-6-9(2)(a).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Were Hill's wages recoverable or protected by UFTA §25-6-9(1) (good faith & reasonably equivalent value)?	Wages are not "reasonably equivalent value" because Hill's services perpetuated the Ponzi scheme and exacerbated investor harm.	Hill provided bona fide administrative services that discharged an antecedent debt and thus constituted reasonably equivalent value.	Reversed: Court found a genuine dispute on value; administrative services can constitute reasonably equivalent value (court assumed good faith for summary-judgment purposes).
Were the $113,878 renovation payments recoverable from Hill as the person "for whose benefit the transfer was made" under §25-6-9(2)(a)?	Renovations benefited Hill (as homeowner and caregiver), so transfers were for his benefit and recoverable.	Payments solely benefited Hill’s wife (accessibility), so Hill was not the person for whose benefit the transfer was made.	Reversed: Genuine dispute exists whether Hill personally received a direct benefit; summary judgment for Receiver on this point was improper.
Was the Ponzi presumption applicable?	Receiver: Bliss acted as a Ponzi scheme, so transfers presumed fraudulent.	Defendants initially contested but conceded on appeal.	Ponzi presumption applied and was not contested on appeal.

Banner Bank v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 916 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 2019) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment genuine-issue standard)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (moving party’s burden and burden-shifting at summary judgment)
Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2008) (Ponzi-presumption: transfers by a Ponzi operator are presumed fraudulent)
Klein v. Cornelius, 786 F.3d 1310 (10th Cir. 2015) (value analysis focuses on preservation of transferor’s net worth)
S.E.C. v. Res. Dev. Int’l, LLC, 487 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2007) (defining "value" as antecedent debt satisfaction/property transferred)
Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2006) (discussing referral-fee exception where payment directly solicited investors)
In re Meredith, 527 F.3d 372 (4th Cir. 2008) (person-for-whose-benefit requires actual, direct benefit from transfer)