George Wharton v. Kevin Chappell
765 F.3d 953
9th Cir.2014Background
- Wharton killed Linda Smith in their California apartment; the body was found in a barrel after a blunt-force assault and asphyxia, leading to a first-degree murder conviction and a death sentence after a separate penalty phase.
- Wharton admitted killing Smith but claimed provocation; the California jury rejected the provocation defense and found first-degree murder; penalty-phase evidence included Wharton’s prior murder and rape convictions, mental illness evidence, and an abusive childhood.
- Wharton argued in habeas that jurors saw him shackled during transportation through the courthouse, outside the courtroom, constituting a due-process violation; the district court held the sightings were brief and non-courtroom, not prejudicial.
- Counsel William Duval chose a guilt-phase strategy focused on proving second-degree murder or manslaughter by provocation, avoiding intoxication or mental-health defenses to prevent exposing 1975 crimes of murder and rape to the jury.
- At the penalty phase, the state introduced prior felony convictions; Wharton presented mitigation including mental-health testimony and history of abuse; the district court denied relief on most penalty-phase ineffective-assistance claims but remanded on Crawford-related issues.
- The district court remanded for factual development on whether Crawford, Wharton’s half-brother, could have testified and whether his testimony would have prejudiced the defense; the court concluded that prejudicial impact depended on whether Crawford would have testified and what he would have said.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shackling visibility violated due process? | Wharton contends transport shackling seen by jurors breached due process. | Chappell argues brief, non-courtroom sightings do not inherently prejudice and are not a constitutional violation. | No due-process violation; prejudicial impact not shown. |
| Guilt-phase ineffective assistance—provocation strategy only? | Duval should have pursued intoxication and mental-health defenses in addition to provocation. | Strategic decision to avoid opening door to prior crimes was reasonable; intoxication defenses lacked day-to-murder support. | No deficient performance; strategy was reasonable and not prejudicial. |
| Penalty-phase ineffective assistance—mental-health presentation? | Duval failed to present adequate mental-health mitigation evidence. | Duval hired multiple experts; presentation was reasonable and did not prejudice. | No prejudice; substantial evidence of mental illness presented, and decisions within reasonable professional judgment. |
| Penalty-phase evidence—failure to present Crawford testimony? | Crawford’s testimony about Crawford could have provided significant mitigating context. | Strategic non-call could avoid harming defense by exposing prior convictions; Crawford’s testimony would be largely cumulative or harmful. | Remanded for factual development to determine deficient performance and prejudice; relief contingent on Crawford’s availability and impact. |
Key Cases Cited
- Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (U.S. 2005) (distinguishes in-court shackling from transport shackling; due-process concerns differ)
- Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2002) (limited prejudice where out-of-court shackling was brief or non-visual to jury)
- Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2004) (jurors’ view of shackling outside courtroom not inherently prejudicial)
- Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2009) (standard for evaluating ineffective-assistance and mitigation in capital cases)
- Caro v. Calderon (Caro I), 165 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1999) (milestones for evaluating the breadth of mitigation investigation in capital sentencing)