George Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
940 F.3d 954
| 7th Cir. | 2019Background
- Plaintiff George Walker, a Stateville inmate with progressive neurologic disease (later diagnosed as primary lateral sclerosis), underwent lumbar fusion at UIC on March 23, 2011; UIC issued a global approval for surgery and follow-up.
- The scheduled three‑month post‑op neurosurgery follow‑up did not occur; from 2011–2014 Wexford’s UM system had no reliable alert for expired off‑site authorizations.
- Walker received intermittent on‑site care at Stateville from Wexford clinicians including Dr. Saleh Obaisi (first saw Walker Sept. 26, 2012); Dr. Obaisi ordered tests and sought UM approval for neurology referral in Dec. 2012; UIC neurology appointment occurred April 24, 2013.
- Over 2013–2016 Walker had multiple off‑site evaluations and imaging; UIC identified hardware issues and ultimately performed revision/extension fusion March 30, 2016; UIC clinicians diagnosed Walker with PLS while he was treated after the second surgery.
- Walker sued Dr. Obaisi and Wexford under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference: (1) Obaisi failed to secure timely post‑op follow‑up/referrals; (2) Wexford maintained policies/practices (including failing to track expired authorizations) that caused delays.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the merits, holding no genuine issue of deliberate indifference by Obaisi or municipal‑level liability for Wexford.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dr. Obaisi was deliberately indifferent to Walker’s serious medical needs | Obaisi delayed/refused timely referrals to UIC and ignored delays, causing diagnostic/treatment delay | Obaisi reasonably ordered tests, treated symptoms, lacked control over UIC scheduling, and did not cause the delays | No deliberate indifference; summary judgment for Obaisi |
| Whether Wexford is liable under Monell for policies/practices that caused the delay | Wexford failed to implement procedures to ensure authorized off‑site care occurred and deferred scheduling to UIC, constituting a policy of inaction | Wexford lacked control over UIC schedule; occasional missed referrals ≠ knowledge of a widespread constitutional risk | No municipal liability; summary judgment for Wexford |
| Whether Walker proved causation/verifying medical evidence that delays worsened his condition | Delays in follow‑up caused deterioration and foreclosed alternative treatment options | Medical record and expert testimony do not establish that earlier follow‑up would have prevented deterioration; causation speculative | Plaintiff failed to show the required causal link or non‑speculative verifying medical evidence |
| Whether Walker exhausted administrative remedies under PLRA | Walker argued exhaustion was not dispositive here | District court found failure to exhaust; appellate court held merits disposition obviated need to resolve exhaustion | Seventh Circuit did not decide exhaustion because it affirmed on the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (subjective knowledge standard for constitutional risk)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires a policy or custom causing the violation)
- Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing negligence from deliberate indifference in prison medical care)
- Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Correction, 849 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2017) (a policy of inaction can ground Monell liability in prison context)
- Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2016) (subjective deliberate indifference standard explained)
- Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013) (delay‑of‑care claims require verifying medical evidence that delay caused harm)
- Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 2005) (individual liability under § 1983 requires personal causation or participation)
