George v. George, 476 Mass. 65

Clifford and Jacquelyn George married in 1989 and divorced in 2002; their separation agreement (merged into the judgment) required Clifford to pay Jacquelyn $1,800/month alimony, terminating on July 30, 2026, or upon death/remarriage.
The Alimony Reform Act (St. 2011, c. 124) took effect March 1, 2012, reclassifying existing awards as general term alimony and establishing durational caps (percentage-based presumptive termination dates) with limited deviation if "required in the interests of justice."
The Act included a phase-in (uncodified §5) restricting when payors may file modification complaints solely based on exceeding the new durational limits; for marriages >10 and ≤15 years, the earliest filing date was March 1, 2015.
Clifford filed a modification complaint on August 26, 2013 seeking termination of alimony (among other requests); the parties’ marriage length ~144 months, so the Act’s durational cap would have presumptively ended payments April 23, 2011.
The Probate and Family Court denied Clifford’s requested relief, finding deviation beyond the Act’s durational limits was warranted because Jacquelyn allegedly bargained for a specific termination date tied to property division; Clifford appealed.
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed denial of relief but on the ground the complaint was premature under uncodified §5 and provided guidance on the proper application of the §49(b) "interests of justice" deviation standard.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Clifford could seek modification before the March 1, 2015 phase‑in date in uncodified §5	Clifford argued he could file in 2013 to invoke the Act’s durational limits and terminate alimony	Jacquelyn relied on §5 phase‑in to bar premature filings based solely on durational limits	Complaint filed Aug 26, 2013 was premature; dismissal affirmed because §5 bars such filings before March 1, 2015 for marriages of this length
Whether deviation beyond §49(b) durational limits was warranted under the "interests of justice"	Clifford contended deviation was not warranted and Act's limits should apply	Judge found deviation warranted, reasoning Jacquelyn bargained for a later termination date tied to property division	Court vacated that analytical approach as erroneous: recipient bears burden to prove by preponderance that deviation is required; findings must be based on current evidence, consider statutory factors, and cannot rest on speculative bargaining at divorce

Rodman v. Rodman, 470 Mass. 539 (retroactive application of durational limits to pre‑Act awards)
Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527 (same; construing Act's retroactivity)
Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653 (phase‑in and scope of permissible claims under the Act)
Doktor v. Doktor, 470 Mass. 547 (discussing phase‑in purpose to avoid a rush to court)
Duff‑Kareores v. Kareores, 474 Mass. 528 (judge’s discretion under the Act but must consider statutory factors)
Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230 (standards for alimony determination under the Act)
Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366 (modification judged by circumstances at time of hearing)
Katz v. Katz, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 472 (courts may consider payor’s current assets/income at modification hearing)