978 F.3d 220
5th Cir.2020Background
- Plaintiffs (two voters with previously rejected absentee ballots and several voting-rights organizations) sued Texas officials challenging the State’s mail-in ballot signature-verification and voter-notification procedures under the Fourteenth Amendment, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act.
- Texas law requires (1) a signed mail-in ballot application, (2) a signed carrier-envelope certificate, and (3) review by an Early Voting Ballot Board (EVBB) or a Signature Verification Committee (SVC) that may compare signatures with those on file; rejected ballots are recorded and voters receive notice within ten days post-election but no statutory cure procedure is required.
- The district court granted partial summary judgment for plaintiffs and enjoined Texas from rejecting ballots for perceived signature mismatches unless local officials followed new, court-crafted notice, cure, and signature-verification procedures; it ordered the Secretary of State either to issue an advisory adopting those procedures or to order that mismatched-signature ballots not be rejected.
- The Secretary appealed and requested a stay of the injunction pending appeal; the district court denied a stay, and the Fifth Circuit granted a stay after a brief motions-panel consideration.
- The Fifth Circuit panel concluded the Secretary is likely to succeed on the merits because (a) plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim likely fails for lack of a cognizable liberty or property interest, (b) the Anderson/Burdick framework—rather than Mathews/Eldridge—governs Fourteenth Amendment challenges to election laws, (c) Texas’s signature-verification regime is a reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction justified by the State’s interest in preventing mail-ballot fraud, and (d) the district court’s injunction improperly commanded discretionary action by the Secretary in violation of Ex parte Young.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Texas’s signature-verification and notice procedures give rise to a cognizable procedural-due-process interest | Richardson: Texas’s mail-in framework creates a protected liberty/property interest triggering due process (notice and cure) | Hughs: Plaintiffs failed to identify a cognizable liberty or property interest in vote-by-mail rejection determinations | Held: Plaintiffs likely failed to allege a cognizable due-process interest; stay granted because Secretary likely to prevail on this point |
| Proper doctrinal test for procedural due-process challenges to election laws | Plaintiffs/district ct: Apply Mathews v. Eldridge balancing to determine what process is due | Hughs: Anderson/Burdick governs First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to election laws; Eldridge is the wrong framework | Held: Anderson/Burdick is the appropriate framework for election-law challenges; district court erred by applying Eldridge |
| Whether signature-verification and lack of pre-rejection cure impose a "severe" burden requiring strict scrutiny | Plaintiffs: Rejection without timely notice and cure causes complete disenfranchisement for affected voters, so burden is severe | Hughs: Signature checks are analogous to photo-ID rules and are reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions justified by preventing mail-ballot fraud; burden is not severe | Held: Signature-verification is not a severe burden but a reasonable restriction; Texas’s anti-fraud interest justifies it |
| Whether the district court could order the Secretary to issue specific advisories/enforcement actions (Ex parte Young/sovereign immunity) | Plaintiffs: Nationwide/classwide relief appropriate; Secretary may be ordered to change advisories or stop rejections to remedy constitutional violations | Hughs: Injunction commanded discretionary actions and enforcement choices reserved to the Secretary under state law, so Young does not authorize such affirmative control | Held: The injunction improperly controlled the Secretary’s discretionary functions; sovereign-immunity/Young principles likely bar the remedial order |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (announcing framework for evaluating burdens on voting rights)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (refining Anderson: severe burdens require narrow tailoring; reasonable burdens need only legitimate state interests)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (general due-process balancing test relied on by district court but held inapposite here)
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (limits on federal courts’ power to order affirmative relief that controls state officers’ discretionary acts)
- Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (upholding voter-ID rules; discussed analogy to signature verification and burdens)
- Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting heightened fraud risk in mail-in voting)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (stay factors and standards)
- Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986) (states may adopt prophylactic measures to protect electoral integrity)
- Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (states’ authority to regulate elections to ensure order and fairness)
- Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (state interest in protecting integrity of elections)