934 F.3d 483
6th Cir.2019Background
- George Clark was convicted of first-degree murder in 2003; the State’s case rested virtually entirely on preliminary-examination testimony of one eyewitness, Bearia Stewart, who at trial refused to affirm that testimony and later recanted.
- No physical evidence tied Clark to the crime; another witness (Tammy Wiseman) later recanted an inculpatory statement attributed to Clark.
- In 2015 Clark produced an affidavit from Kaneka Jackson claiming she saw a different tall man shoot the victim and that she told her father (an Inkster detective), who told her to remain silent.
- A Sixth Circuit panel authorized Clark to file a second or successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C), finding Jackson’s affidavit made a prima facie showing that Brady suppression might have occurred.
- The district court granted conditional habeas relief without an evidentiary hearing; the State appealed, arguing (a) the Brady claim requires an evidentiary hearing to resolve credibility and suppression, and (b) Clark cannot meet AEDPA’s strict standards for a successive petition.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant, holding an evidentiary hearing is required to assess (1) whether Jackson actually told her detective father (suppression element) and (2) whether Jackson’s affidavit, if proved, meets § 2244(b)(2)(B)’s clear-and-convincing standard that no reasonable juror would find Clark guilty.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether suppressed evidence (Jackson affidavit) is favorable under Brady | Jackson’s eyewitness ID of another shooter is exculpatory and thus favorable evidence | Favorable only “if the Jackson affidavit is true”; challenges credibility | Court: The affidavit is plainly favorable for Brady purposes (credibility not required to qualify as favorable) |
| Whether the State suppressed Jackson’s ID (Brady suppression element) | Jackson says she told her detective father, who told her to keep quiet; this implies suppression by police/prosecution | State contests suppression and contends credibility of Jackson is central; argues district court needed hearing | Court: Suppression is a contested, credibility-driven factual question that warrants an evidentiary hearing |
| Whether prejudice exists under Brady (reasonable probability of different result) | Jackson’s ID directly contradicts the State’s lone trial witness; disclosure would likely undermine confidence in verdict | State says jurors could disbelieve Jackson; AEDPA demands high showing for successive petitions | Court: Prejudice is plausible given reliance on single witness; whether prejudice exists must be resolved at an evidentiary hearing under AEDPA’s standard |
| Whether Clark satisfies AEDPA § 2244(b)(2)(B) (due diligence and "if proven" clear-and-convincing standard) | Petition was filed promptly after the affidavit; if Jackson’s ID is proven and viewed with the record, no reasonable juror could convict | State argues Clark cannot meet the clear-and-convincing threshold and remand/hearing is unnecessary | Court: Due diligence satisfied for remand; whether the affidavit, if proven, meets the § 2244 standard is a credibility question for an evidentiary hearing; remand for further proceedings required |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to accused)
- Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (Brady prejudice standard: reasonable probability of different result undermining confidence)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality and cumulative effect analysis)
- Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007) (deference to district court factfinding; role of evidentiary hearings under AEDPA)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (standards for 'failed to develop' and § 2254(e)(2) implications)
- Sawyer v. Hofbauer, 299 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2002) (circumstances where habeas relief may be granted without a hearing)
- In re McDonald, 514 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2008) (successive-petition prima facie standard and consideration of recantation evidence)
- Jamison v. Collins, 291 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2002) (eyewitness ID of different suspect is Brady-favorable evidence)