Geoffrey Spencer Hauer v. State, 466 S.W.3d 886

On Feb. 19, 2012, appellant Geoffrey Hauer was involved in a vehicle accident in Houston; Officer Lucinda Owens arrived first and observed signs of intoxication (unsteady, slurred speech, odor of alcohol).
Owens handcuffed Hauer and placed him in her patrol car while she awaited a DWI-trained officer; she radioed dispatch that he was in the patrol car at 3:08 a.m.
Officer Jorge Roman arrived at 3:25 a.m., removed handcuffs, interviewed Hauer, smelled alcohol, administered field sobriety tests, and arrested Hauer at 3:46 a.m.
Hauer was charged with DWI (with one prior conviction), moved to suppress statements made during the on-scene detention, and requested an Article 38.23 jury instruction; the trial court denied suppression and refused the instruction.
The jury convicted Hauer; on appeal he raised four issues: (1) detention lacked reasonable suspicion, (2) handcuffing/placement in patrol car was an arrest without probable cause, (3) Miranda warnings were required before on-scene statements, and (4) the court erred in denying an Article 38.23 instruction.

Issue	Hauer's Argument	State's Argument	Held
1. Was the initial seizure supported by reasonable suspicion?	Owens lacked specific articulable facts to justify detention.	Owens observed unsteadiness, slurred speech, and alcohol odor at an accident scene—reasonable suspicion to detain for DWI investigation.	Denied: detention was supported by reasonable suspicion.
2. Did handcuffing and seating in patrol car constitute an arrest?	Handcuffing and placement in car converted the seizure into a full arrest absent probable cause.	Handcuffing was reasonable and temporary for officer safety and scene control; did not automatically convert to arrest.	Denied: conduct was a temporary investigative detention, not an arrest.
3. Were Miranda warnings required before on-scene statements?	Statements made after being handcuffed (but before formal arrest) should be suppressed as un‑Mirandized custodial statements.	An investigative detention is not custodial for Miranda purposes; warnings were not required.	Denied: Miranda was not triggered during the investigative detention.
4. Should the jury have received an Article 38.23 instruction on illegally obtained evidence?	Conflicting evidence raised factual disputes about whether evidence/statements were illegally obtained.	No affirmative evidence created a factual dispute; cross-examination alone did not establish conflict.	Denied: no disputed factual issue warranting Article 38.23 instruction.

Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (distinguishing investigative detention from arrest)
Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (reasonableness of force and handcuffing during detention)
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (U.S. 1984) (investigative detentions are generally not custodial for Miranda purposes)
Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (requirements for submitting Article 38.23 jury instruction)