Geoffrey S. Stiff v. Town of Belgrade, 322 A.3d 1167

Geoffrey and Carolyn Stiff, owners of a lot on Long Pond in Belgrade, challenged their neighbors, the Joneses, regarding a new structure built on the Joneses' adjacent, non-conforming lot in the shoreland zone.
The Belgrade Shoreland Zoning Ordinance (SZO) allows only one residential dwelling on the lot; the pre-existing house on the Joneses' lot was already non-conforming due to its location within the minimum setback from the water.
The Joneses initially obtained a permit for a detached garage, but instead constructed a much larger two-story building with three bedrooms, two bathrooms, and living areas similar to a house.
The Planning Board granted the Joneses an after-the-fact permit for the new structure, contingent on a prohibition of kitchen appliances to prevent it from being a second residential unit; the Stiffs appealed unsuccessfully through the town Board of Appeals and Superior Court.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the Planning Board’s interpretation of the SZO definition of “accessory structure” de novo.
The court found the new structure was not “incidental and subordinate” to the main house and could not be considered accessory merely by restricting one function (cooking) within it.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the new structure is an accessory structure under the SZO	Structure duplicates main house, not accessory	Structure is accessory due to prohibition on kitchen use	Not accessory—a duplicate house, not “incidental and subordinate”
Effect of imposing functional limitations (no cooking) on a duplicate residential structure	Cooking ban doesn’t make a duplicate house “accessory”	Banning kitchen appliances makes it a non-dwelling, thus accessory	Prohibition on one function does not transform structure into an accessory
Appropriateness of Planning Board’s legal interpretation	Board misapplied SZO’s definition of accessory	Board’s interpretation is entitled to deference	Interpretation reviewed de novo; Board misconstrued the ordinance
Whether activity-based conditions can circumvent ordinance purposes	Allowing functional limits enables circumvention	Conditions align with SZO's requirements and protection goals	Such conditions are unenforceable/subterfuge and subvert SZO’s protective purpose

Tominsky v. Town of Ogunquit, 2023 ME 30 (deference to local board findings unless clearly erroneous)
Jordan v. City of Ellsworth, 2003 ME 82 (court’s approach to characterization of structures as mixed law and fact but reviews ordinance interpretation de novo)
Stewart v. Town of Sedgwick, 2000 ME 157 (direct review by Law Court of local board where prior appellate review was in an intermediate capacity)