Geoffrey S. Stiff v. Stephen C. Jones, 268 A.3d 294

In the 1960s Edmund W. Hill and Parker Lake Shores, Inc. recorded three adjacent plats (1962, 1963, 1964) creating numerous house lots subject to twelve deed restrictions, including a 15-foot side‑setback restriction and a restriction limiting construction to one-family dwellings with private garages/boathouses.
The Stiffs and the Joneses own adjacent parcels originally conveyed by Hill on August 16, 1969; both deeds incorporate the common deed restrictions.
In 2017–2018 the Joneses built a two‑story freestanding structure; the Stiffs allege it violates the one‑dwelling and 15‑foot side‑setback restrictions; the Joneses deny the violations and dispute survey boundaries.
The Stiffs sued asserting enforcement of implied restrictive covenants (common‑scheme‑of‑development doctrine) and sought a boundary declaration; the Joneses counterclaimed for a boundary declaration, trespass, and nuisance.
At summary judgment the court rejected the Stiffs’ 12‑lot common‑scheme theory and granted partial summary judgment for the Joneses on Count 1 as to that theory, but left other theories (a 71‑lot theory and a 5‑lot theory) unresolved.
The trial court certified the partial summary judgment as a final judgment under M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1); the Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory, concluding certification was improvidently granted because alternative factual theories remained unresolved.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court properly certified the partial summary judgment under M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1) to permit an immediate appeal	Stiffs: the court’s partial summary judgment disposed of Count 1 and certification was appropriate	Joneses: the partial judgment was final as to the 12‑lot theory (and supported certification)	Court: Certification was improvident because other viable, unresolved theories remained; appeal dismissed as interlocutory
Whether summary judgment on the 12‑lot theory resolved Count 1 (existence of a common scheme)	Stiffs: several configurations (71‑lot or 5‑lot) independently establish a common scheme of development	Joneses: only the 12 lots (or a smaller set sharing Hill) are relevant and do not constitute the ‘‘vast majority’’ required to prove a common scheme	Court: The court correctly rejected the 12‑lot theory on the record, but could not infer rejection of alternative theories; unresolved factual issues remain as to the other configurations

Corinth Pellets, LLC v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 246 A.3d 586 (Me. 2021) (describing Rule 54(b) certification requirements and need for specific, reasoned findings)
Chase Home Fin. LLC v. Higgins, 953 A.2d 1131 (Me. 2008) (factors trial courts should consider before certifying partial final judgments)
McClare v. Rocha, 86 A.3d 22 (Me. 2014) (review of Rule 54(b) certification for abuse of discretion and requirement of valid justification)
Tisdale v. Buch, 81 A.3d 377 (Me. 2013) (discussing the common‑scheme‑of‑development/implied restrictive covenants doctrine)
Sager v. Town of Bowdoinham, 845 A.2d 567 (Me. 2004) (certification inappropriate where partial judgment could not produce a full resolution of the claim)