Geoffrey Madge v. State
160 So. 3d 86
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Geoffrey Madge, on probation, was charged in a violation-of-probation (VOP) affidavit for committing loitering and prowling after an incident at a restaurant.
- A lay witness (Amy Knowles) testified she returned to her car with a takeout order, saw Madge approach the passenger side, locked her car, and saw Madge repeatedly pull the passenger door handle and gesture toward himself and the passenger seat.
- Knowles drove to a nearby lot and called police; officers arrived after Madge had left the immediate car area and later found him near the restaurant.
- One responding officer testified at the VOP hearing that he gave Madge an opportunity to dispel concern, but Madge’s account did not dispel it; the officer arrested him for loitering and prowling.
- Madge testified he approached because Knowles had motioned him over, intended to ask for directions, and left when it became clear she did not want to speak; he cooperated with officers.
- The trial court found Madge violated probation; the Fourth District reversed, holding the State failed to prove loitering and prowling because officers did not personally observe conduct establishing the statute’s elements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Madge) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence proved loitering and prowling to support probation violation | Lay-witness observations and officer investigation support the charge; conviction need not be limited to conduct witnessed by the officer | Officer did not personally observe any alarming conduct; lay observations cannot substitute for officer’s contemporaneous observation of incipient criminal behavior | Reversed: insufficient evidence because officers did not personally observe conduct showing "not usual" behavior and an "immediate concern" of future criminality |
| Whether loitering/prowling may be based on conduct occurring before officer arrival | State urged broader view permitting prior conduct to support charge | Madge argued statute is forward-looking and requires officer-observed conduct indicating incipient criminal behavior | Court held prior lay observations cannot supply the requisite officer-observed conduct; statute is forward-looking |
| Whether reliance on arrest-warrant statutory limits (§ 901.15) controls evidentiary proof at trial | State suggested officer need not have witnessed misdemeanor to support loitering prosecution | Madge argued officer’s lack of firsthand alarming observations fatal to proof of elements | Court held arrest-power limits are distinct from the evidentiary requirement; the elements of loitering/prowling require officer-observed conduct to satisfy the State’s burden |
| Standard for evidence sufficiency in VOP based on loitering/prowling | State requested overruling of precedent requiring officer observation | Madge relied on existing precedent requiring officer-observed, articulable facts of incipient criminality | Court declined to recede from precedent and reversed the VOP for lack of evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975) (upheld statute and explained purpose: prevent incipient crime)
- D.A. v. State, 471 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (loitering statute is forward-looking; reversed conviction based on post hoc police discovery)
- V.E. v. State, 539 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (reaffirmed forward-looking nature; prior suspicious acts alone insufficient)
- Jones v. State, 117 So. 3d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (reversed where officer testimony did not establish alarming conduct in officer’s presence)
- J.S.B. v. State, 729 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (recognized need to prove statute’s elements, which must have occurred in officer’s presence)
- K.R.R. v. State, 629 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (reversed adjudication where officer did not witness alarming behavior)