Geoffrey Lucker v. Texas Department of Transportation, 13-16-00380-CV

Background

On March 20, 2012, rising floodwaters at FM 1624 / Middle Yegua Creek swept Sally Lucker off the roadway and she drowned; her husband Geoffrey Lucker sued the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) in a derivative premises-liability action.
TxDOT employee Paul Meinke monitored rising water, placed two MUTCD-compliant “Watch For Water On Road” signs (one temporary orange with flags, one permanent yellow) about 2,500 feet from the bridge approach, and later ordered barricades that arrived after the incident.
At trial the jury found both Sally 49% negligent and TxDOT 51% negligent, but also answered special questions finding Paul was reacting to an emergency and that the accident was not proximately caused by conscious indifference or reckless disregard.
TxDOT moved for a take-nothing judgment on four independent grounds: (1) the emergency exception under the Texas Tort Claims Act; (2) lack of evidence that plaintiff lacked actual knowledge of the danger; (3) adequate warning (compliance with MUTCD); and (4) no duty because the hazard was open and obvious.
The trial court granted TxDOT’s motion in a final judgment that did not specify which ground(s) it relied upon; Lucker appealed, challenging only the submission of the emergency-exception questions to the jury.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court erred by submitting emergency-exception questions to the jury	Lucker argued the emergency-exception questions were improper and challenged both jury questions	TxDOT argued the questions were proper and also sought alternative bases for judgment (emergency exception, plaintiff's knowledge, adequate warnings, open-and-obvious)	Court overruled Lucker’s issues and affirmed because Lucker failed to challenge all independent grounds supporting the judgment
Whether the final judgment must be reversed when the trial court’s order did not state which ground sustained the motion	Lucker contended the judgment rested solely on the jury’s emergency-related answers so other grounds need not be addressed	TxDOT argued the judgment’s language showed the court considered filings and argument and could have relied on any of the four independent grounds	Held that when a dispositive order does not specify grounds, appellant must negate every independent ground in the motion; Lucker waived review of three grounds he did not challenge
Whether MUTCD-compliant signs and warnings constitute adequate warning as a matter of law	(Not litigated on appeal) Lucker did not rebut TxDOT’s assertion that signs were adequate	TxDOT asserted MUTCD-compliant signs are adequate and supported dismissal on that basis	Court treated this as an independently sufficient ground for affirmance because Lucker failed to challenge it below/on appeal
Whether open-and-obvious condition or plaintiff’s actual knowledge defeats duty	(Not litigated on appeal) Lucker did not contest these defenses	TxDOT asserted no duty or lack of proof that plaintiff lacked actual knowledge	Court held these independent defenses, if valid, support the take-nothing judgment; Lucker waived challenge by not addressing them

Key Cases Cited

Fort Bend Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1991) (when a trial court sustains a motion on unspecified grounds, appellant must show the judgment cannot be sustained on any ground asserted in the motion)
Britton v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 95 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002) (an appellant must attack all independent bases that fully support a judgment)
State v. Williams, 940 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. 1996) (actual knowledge of danger is an essential element for certain premises-liability claims against the state)
State v. Miguel, 2 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 1999) (signs that comply with the MUTCD constitute adequate warning as a matter of law)
Austin v. Kroger, 465 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. 2015) (no duty to warn of open and obvious conditions)