Gentry v. East West Partners Club Management Co.
816 F.3d 228
4th Cir.2016Background
- Judith Gentry, an executive housekeeper at Maggie Valley Club, injured her left ankle in 2007, had surgery in 2008, returned to work, and later received a 30% permanent impairment rating in 2010.
- Maggie Valley hired East West to manage the Club in 2008; Jay Manner was hired as general manager. Gentry’s workers’ compensation claim was settled in Nov. 2010.
- Gentry was terminated in Dec. 2010 as part of a claimed cost‑saving restructuring; defendants presented evidence of multi‑year losses and consolidation of managerial roles.
- Gentry sued under the ADA, Title VII, and state law (workers’ compensation retaliation, tortious interference). A jury found for Gentry on state claims (workers’ compensation retaliation and tortious interference) awarding $20,000 total, and for defendants on the federal discrimination claims.
- On appeal Gentry challenged: (1) the district court’s ADA jury instructions (causation and disability definitions), (2) exclusion of evidence about defendants’ insurance/indemnification, and (3) the adequacy of the damages award. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causation standard for ADA claims | Gentry: ADA should adopt Title VII’s §2000e‑2(m) "motivating factor" standard | Defendants: ADA does not incorporate Title VII’s mixed‑motive standard; only Title VII has that text | Court: ADA requires "but‑for" causation (Gross analysis applies); Title VII’s motivating‑factor standard not incorporated |
| Definition of "substantially limits" under ADA/ADAAA | Gentry: jury instruction ("prevents or significantly restricts") is too demanding post‑ADAAA/EEOC regs | Defendants: instruction was acceptable; plaintiff failed to preserve objection | Court: Plain‑error review; even assuming error, no reasonable probability it affected outcome; no reversal |
| "Regarded as" and "record of" disability instructions | Gentry: court misstated/omitted ADAAA language ("regarded as" should not require perceived substantial limitation; "record of" should include "misclassified") | Defendants: instructions adequately conveyed perceived‑disability theory; omissions were not prejudicial | Court: No reversible error—jury was told termination due to perception of disability would suffice; omission of "misclassified" not shown to prejudice |
| Evidence of defendants’ insurance/indemnification | Gentry: exclusion prevented her from rebutting defendants’ "poor mouthing" and alleged inability to pay, possibly depressing damages | Defendants: financial evidence was central to legitimate defense (cost‑cutting); insurance/indemnity evidence was of limited probative value and potentially prejudicial | Court: District court did not abuse discretion excluding further insurance/indemnity evidence; no indication jury considered ability to pay |
| Adequacy of damages (new trial) | Gentry: $20,000 is inadequate compared to expert back/front pay; jury must have improperly reduced award (e.g., for mitigation) | Defendants: jury could discredit expert, find mitigation inadequate, or infer decreased future earnings from Club’s financial woes | Court: Denial of new trial affirmed—verdict not against clear weight of evidence; district court’s discretion upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- Volvo Trademark Holding Aktiebolaget v. Clark Mach. Co., 510 F.3d 474 (4th Cir. 2007) (trial court has broad discretion in framing jury instructions)
- Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. FireEagle, Ltd., 228 F.3d 531 (4th Cir. 2000) (jury instructions reviewed de novo for correctness of legal statements)
- Bunn v. Oldendorff Carriers GmbH & Co. KG, 723 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2013) (instructions adequate when considered as a whole; reversible error requires serious prejudice)
- Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (where statute lacks motivating‑factor language, plaintiff must prove but‑for causation)
- Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012) (ADA requires but‑for causation; rejected importation of Title VII mixed‑motive standard)
- Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010) (ADA does not incorporate Title VII’s §2000e‑2(m) motivating‑factor rule)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (Supreme Court interpretation that language like "because of" implies but‑for causation applied in Title VII retaliation context)