Geneva College v. Secretary United States DePartment of Health
778 F.3d 422
3rd Cir.2015Background
- Appellees (religious nonprofits and dioceses) object to the ACA’s preventive-services mandate requiring contraceptive coverage and challenge the HHS "accommodation" under RFRA.
- The accommodation allows an eligible religious nonprofit to self-certify its objection (EBSA Form 700 or later direct notice) so that an insurer or third-party administrator (TPA) — not the nonprofit — must provide contraceptive coverage without cost-sharing.
- Some Catholic dioceses qualify for a full regulatory exemption (houses of worship); affiliated Catholic nonprofits qualify only for the accommodation, creating different regulatory treatment.
- District courts granted preliminary (and in one case permanent) injunctions, finding the accommodation substantially burdens religious exercise because signing the form purportedly "triggers" or "facilitates" objectionable coverage and divides the Church.
- The Third Circuit reviewed whether the accommodation imposes a "substantial burden" under RFRA and reversed, holding the accommodation does not substantially burden appellees’ religious exercise.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the accommodation’s self-certification "triggers/facilitates/ makes complicit" provision of contraceptive coverage and thus substantially burdens religious exercise under RFRA | Submission of the form causes, facilitates, or makes the religious organization complicit in providing objectionable contraceptives; facing fines coerces compliance | The obligation to provide coverage is created by federal law and regulations; submitting the form merely notifies refusal and removes the organization from providing services | Held: No substantial burden — the law, not the form, obligates insurers/TPAs to provide coverage; the form does not make applicants complicit |
| Whether the differential treatment (exemption for dioceses vs. accommodation for Catholic nonprofits) substantially burdens religious exercise by dividing the Church | The different regimes split the Catholic Church, forcing affiliates to take actions that conflict with shared doctrine | The exemption definition tracks longstanding tax/IRC lines; differing treatment does not compel religiously forbidden conduct or require expulsion of affiliates | Held: No substantial burden — regulatory distinction is administrative and does not force religious acts or restructurings prohibited by religion |
| Whether RFRA’s "substantial burden" inquiry requires deference to plaintiffs’ characterization of burden | Plaintiffs: courts must accept plaintiffs’ account of coercion and complicity tied to sincere beliefs | Govt: courts may evaluate the nature and degree of the asserted burden and the causal link between required act and objectionable result | Held: Court may and must assess objectively whether the act required (filing notice) actually burdens religious exercise; deference to sincerity does not decide substantiality |
| Whether plaintiffs likely to succeed on RFRA merits (thus supporting injunctions) | Plaintiffs claim likelihood of success because accommodation forces moral participation or choice between violating beliefs or losing benefits | Govt contends plaintiffs cannot show a substantial burden, so RFRA’s strict scrutiny need not be reached | Held: Plaintiffs failed to show likelihood of success on the substantial-burden element; injunctions reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (recognizing substantial-burden analysis for contraceptive mandate absent an accommodation)
- Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (RFRA reinstates Sherbert/Yoder compelling-interest test)
- Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (refusal of Sherbert/Yoder balancing; prompted RFRA)
- Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (compelling-interest test in free exercise cases)
- Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (religious exemption from generally applicable law under compelling-interest framework)
- Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (government program’s incidental effects may not constitute coercive burden)
- Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (Free Exercise does not entitle individuals to dictate government internal procedures)
- Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (Free Exercise requires actual burden on exercise to warrant exemption)
- Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (RFRA claim fails where government action does not require the claimant to modify religious behavior)
- Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014) (accommodation mechanics: federal law — not self-certification — creates insurers’/TPAs’ obligation)
- Mich. Catholic Conference v. Sebelius, 755 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2014) (submission of self-certification does not trigger coverage; obligation originates in federal law)
- Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (accommodation relieves religious organization of obligation; insurers/TPAs act under federal compulsion)